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A STATEMENT OF FACTS: THE REALITY OF PUBLIC SAFETY
EMPLOYEE PENSION FUNDS IN THE STATE OF ILLINOIS
By Jerry J. Marzullo, Joseph Weishampel, and David Grady
Jerry J. Marzullo, J.D., M.B.A., is a founding partner of Puchalski Goodloe Marzullo, LLP. He represents
public employee labor unions and public pension funds on both state and federal levels. Mr. Marzullo is
a frequent statewide speaker on all relevant labor and pension topics in the State of Illinois. He is one of
the legal counsel for the newly consolidated Statewide Police Officer Pension Investment Fund. He is
also a Battalion Chief with the City of Berwyn Fire Department.
Joseph Weishampel is an associate at Puchalski Goodloe Marzullo, where he represents police and
firefighter pension funds and unions. He previously worked as a staff attorney in the Circuit Court of
Cook County. He is a 2015 graduate of Loyola University Chicago School of Law.
David Grady is a firefighter in Cicero, Illinois where he serves as the President of the pension board and
as a union trustee. He is also a part-time law student at Loyola University Chicago and a fellow for the
Beazley Institute for Health Law and Policy.

I.

INTRODUCTION

Perhaps no other topic in the arena of Illinois labor and employment relations is so
divisive and, therefore, so subject to passionate misinformation, as the current state
of public safety employee pension funds. The debate appears endless with alleged
“facts” and “common sense” solutions permeating everything from local media to the
State Legislature to police squad rooms and firehouse kitchen tables throughout our
great state. Such hyperbole not only muddies the water but obstructs real and
meaningful discussion. This article separates facts from fiction hoping that
interested parties may discuss and debate without distraction.
A common complaint in Illinois politics is that public pension systems are crippling
the state financially and that only drastic action, such as cutting assertedly-generous
benefits, can restore the state’s fiscal health. This article explains that public
pensions in Illinois pay out relatively modest benefits, which generate economic
activity roughly equal to what is paid. Further, the pension funds have made every
payment and weathered every economic downturn during the past 100 years. Thus,
there is not a “crisis” demanding a drastic emergency solution. This article reviews
the Illinois pension system, refutes assertions made by critics, and explains the
statistics critics use to shock audiences. This article sets forth the true state of
pensions in Illinois: while there is not a crisis, there is a structural problem in that
the funds do not have enough money. The leading cause of this fact, by far, is that
plan sponsors have systematically underfunded the pension system.
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In late 2019, Illinois Governor J.B. Pritzker signed into law Public Act 101-0610
(“Consolidation Law”), which concerns Article 3 and 4 pension systems, the focus of
this article. The Consolidation Law transferred investing assets and authority
previously held by each Article 3 and 4 fund to two statewide Pension Investment
Funds, to obtain higher returns on investment. The Consolidation Law also will
terminate each municipality’s power to hire its own actuary to calculate its annual
contribution. Finally, the Consolidation Law reversed some previous changes that
decreased benefits for employees hired after January 1, 2011. This article examines
those changes. This article also discusses ongoing challenges that Article 3 and 4
funds face, including each fund’s relationship with its municipality and the
mechanisms by which a fund may secure the money that municipality owes.

II.

PENSIONS IN ILLINOIS
A. The Perception

Illinois’ public employee pension funds are often represented as being on the brink
of failure. Those funds are described with language such as “crisis”1 and “pensionbomb.”2 A typical article from a critic implies that one or more public bodies in
Illinois, or Illinois itself, owe(s) a very large and scary amount of money to a pension
fund as if it is a traditional type of debt, and then makes clear that the taxpayer is “on
the hook” for it.3 For example, one article noted that “[f]or more than 50 years, state
leaders have failed to deal with a slow-burning disaster that has taxpayers on the
hook for $133.5 billion,”4 resulting in pension debt that is “devouring all else in state
government.”5 A Bloomberg article asserted that pension debts amounted to
“$11,000 for every man, woman, and child” in Illinois.6 Critics often attribute
dramatic consequences to the state’s pension debt: it “threatens to swallow the state
budget and suffocate Illinois’ economy.”7 An Illinois Policy Institute (“IPI”) report
asserted that the situation would lead to “crushing the state’s economy with more tax
hikes.”8
These dire diagnoses are invariably followed by the argument that the only way to
“save” the State of Illinois is to diminish pension benefits.9 To further support this
action, critics often decry the supposed generosity of pension benefits. For example,
another IPI article claimed that “[m]ore than 129,000 Illinois public pensioners” will
receive $1 million or more in benefits.10 The article refers to these recipients as
“pension millionaires,” the state’s 1%, a “small, powerful and protected class of
wealth” whose profits are “immense.”11 The article further asserts that “the state’s
social safety net has been gutted to pay for their privileges,”12 which assumes that a
“social safety net” is what the money would be used for if pensions were
unconstitutionally diminished.13
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The Illinois Constitution protects the pensions of public employees.14 Some critics
have claimed that the “crisis” is so extreme that Illinois must amend its constitution
to remove the pension protection clause, which could allow lawmakers to reduce
pension benefits for long serving employees already in the system with the stroke of
a pen.15 Others propose legislation that would de facto reduce benefits in an attempt
to circumvent the pension protection clause.16 One proposal would save less than 1
percent of the current pension debt by freezing pay to individuals already on fixed
incomes.17
One critic-inspired law has already been enacted. Public Act 96-0889, which took
effect January 1, 2011, created a “Tier Two” of pension benefits for employees whose
employment started on or after that date.18 Those benefits were significantly lower
than the benefits enjoyed by employees hired before that date.19 Public Act 96-0889
did this by, inter alia, changing the final salary calculation, reducing survivor
benefits, and decreasing cost of living allowances; some of these changes may have
violated federal Social Security law.20 For Article 3 and 4 pension funds21—the focus
of much of this article—the proportion of employees subject to these lower Tier Two
benefits has steadily grown over time. Yet this lower benefit level has not increased
Article 3 and 4 funds’ funding percentage,22 even before the stock market downturn
associated with COVID-19. Between 2012 and 2017, the aggregate funded ratio for
Article 3 funds dropped from 56.26% to 55.78%, and for Article 4 funds dropped
from 55.56% to 55.10%.23 Lower future benefits should have increased the funded
level, but they have not. The likely reason is that the lower benefits have been
included in the actuarial valuations used to determine municipal contributions, so
required (and actual) municipal contributions have decreased, i.e., the
municipalities, who do not have IMRF-like forced contributions, have enjoyed the
lower municipal contributions but have done very little to make up for their earlier
missed contributions. Instead of improving funded ratios, Tier Two benefit
reductions have taken benefits from future retirees and given that money to
municipalities in the present.
B. The Reality
The hyperbolic rhetoric critics employ skews the debate and negatively affects the
policymaking process.24 It provokes a false sense of emergency, disregards the
history of the problem, and does not address what solutions are actually feasible. 25 It
has also led to illegal policy measures: one or more Tier Two alterations may have
resulted in benefits so low they are in jeopardy of violating the social security safe
harbor law.26 And while politicians recite that employees are not responsible for the
pension system’s problems, they repeatedly ask those employees to bear the burden
of resolving them through freezes, pay cuts, reductions to retirement and healthcare
benefits, and other measures that place the lives of critical employees and the public
at risk.27
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The reality is that there is no crisis, but it is easy to create the appearance of one. The
metrics used to measure pension fund solvency, such as accrued unfunded liability
and pension debt, are unfamiliar to the casual reader. They are generally appropriate
and useful when properly understood. However, they generate large numbers that
obscure the fact that pension funds in Illinois, despite being poorly funded, are
generally solvent now and for the foreseeable future.28 Although there is a problem,
there is not a crisis: any emergency mindset is not justified, and large numbers do
not a crisis make. It would appear that critics are creating a “crisis” and then
adhering to former Chicago Mayor Rahm Emanuel’s doctrine of “never allow[ing] a
[good] crisis go to waste.”29
1. Beneficiaries
The often-criticized Illinois pension recipients have not meaningfully caused or
contributed to the underfunding that plagues the system.30 This is because “public
pensions in Illinois are not significant outliers in terms of expense or generosity.”31
In Illinois, state and local government work is “strongly associated with” incomes
that are 13.5 percent less than comparable private sector employees,32 and
employees with bachelors’ degrees earn 32 percent to 40 percent less than their
private sector counterparts.33 Compared to state and local government employees in
other states, pay and benefits for state and local government employees in Illinois
are toward the middle of the pack,34 but slightly less than the national average.35
Total compensation, including benefits, is lower in Illinois than in other high-income
states, and even less than in neighboring states like Iowa and Minnesota.36
Moreover, public-sector employees comprise just 13.2 percent of the Illinois
workforce, lower than the national average of 15.1 percent.37 Illinois employees also
contribute significantly to their pension fund: they pay more than 75 percent of the
other states.38 Most other states do not cap pension benefits, but Illinois caps
pension benefits at 75 percent of an employee’s final average salary.39 Illinois
pension benefits themselves are in the middle of the pack, over $10,000 annually
lower than the conservative “red states” of Texas and West Virginia.40 Overall,
compared to other states, public employees in Illinois are in the top quarter of
employees in terms of paying in to their pension systems, but in the bottom quarter
in terms of the pension benefits they receive.41 And more Illinois employees are
exempt from receiving social security benefits than the national average.42 There is
little evidence that Illinois’ benefit structure accounts for Illinois’ pension debt when
compared to other states with better-funded pension funds.43
Additionally, public-sector retirees spend their money primarily in the local
economy, which generates significant economic activity.44 A National Institute on
Retirement Security (“NIRS”) study found that every dollar paid out in pension
benefits in 2016 supported a national average of $1.41 in total economic output.45 In
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Illinois, the figure was $1.57.46 A University of Illinois Labor and Employment
Program (“UILEP”) study found that Illinois pension benefit payments nearly pay for
themselves.47 During the period studied, Illinois government entities paid $13.4
billion in pension payments; retirees received an after-tax total of $12.22 billion; this
resulted in $12.78 billion being injected into the Illinois economy.48 Cutting pension
benefits would not only break promises to recipients, it would inflict collateral
damage on the Illinois economy.
2. The Real Problem
If pension recipients in Illinois are not overpaid, is there a crisis? If so, why? And if
not, where do the critics’ numbers come from? There is some degree of monetary
shortfall in the pension system generally, due primarily to a history of inadequate
contributions from plan sponsors.49 Government contributions have fallen short
because government entities have simply chosen to contribute less than necessary.
Government entities have also manipulated the actuarial assumptions used to
calculate contributions, or have chosen actuaries who will do so, to push
contributions into the future. An examination of this history, these methods, and
these assumptions is necessary to understand the true fiscal health of Illinois
pension funds and the potential impact of the new pension fund consolidation
legislation.
Pension fund contribution practices in Illinois have been inadequate for maintaining
the health of the pension funds virtually from the start.50 One source analyzed
Illinois pension laws dating back to 1916 and stated that “financial provisions [were]
entirely inadequate for paying the stipulated pensions when due.”51 In 1959, a report
stated, “Of principle concern to the Commission is the accumulation of large
unfunded accrued liabilities resulting for the most part from the inadequacy of
government contributions in prior years to meet increases in costs.”52 In 1973, a
plan was enacted to have annual contributions mirror what the state pension funds
would pay out that year.53 The General Assembly’s Pension Commission stated that
this plan was “unacceptable since it result[ed] in a deferment of the burden of
financing currently incurred benefit obligations to future generations of taxpayers.” 54
Later, Governor James Thompson committed the state to a plan of contributing only
60% of estimated payouts to defer contributions.55 This “kick the can down the road”
policy became Illinois’ de facto funding policy from 1982 to 1995.56
Recent history is especially illuminating. In 1994, Illinois mandated that each
pension fund be 90 percent funded by 2040 or 2045.57 This new plan prescribed
even lower payments than the previous 1989 plan with which the state had already
failed to comply.58 The timetable set by the 1994 plan—46 or 51 years—is twice as
long as the 25-year period recommended under government accounting standards.59
Such a long timetable adds billions of dollars in extra interest to what is already
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owed, especially where, as in Illinois, contributions are backloaded.60 Worse still, the
plan is designed to allow the state’s overall pension debt to grow until 2029.61
In 2003, with interest rates at historic lows, Illinois issued $10 billion in pension
obligation bonds.62 While this was initially seen as a responsible move to reduce
pension debt and payments, about $2 billion of the bond issuance was diverted away
from pensions.63 In 2006 and 2007, Illinois granted a pension holiday.64 This
allowed the legislature to not contribute the amount required by the 1994 funding
plan; instead, it lowered its payment over that two-year-period to allow it to use the
bonds as the sole form of payment.65 Pension bonds were sold again in 2010 and
2011.66 This borrowing will add a total of $30.8 billion to the state’s pension debt.67
The inadequacy of government contributions has been widely criticized. In its 2017
Annual Financial Report, the Teachers’ Retirement System (“TRS”) wrote: “Since
TRS was founded in 1939, the State of Illinois has never, in any year, funded the
system at a level that standard actuarial practice would define as sufficient.”68 In its
annual reports, the Illinois Commission on Government Forecasting and
Accountability has consistently noted:
The single largest cause—comprising just under 50 percent of the total growth in
underfunding—was that the state’s contributions fell below the actuarially required
level. No other single factor—investment returns, changes in actuarial assumptions,
benefit increases, etc. —comprised more than 20 percent of the deterioration of
funding status. 69
Other calculations were even less flattering. One source concluded that from fiscal
year 1985 to fiscal year 2012, over 47 percent of the growth in the State’s unfunded
liabilities70 came from the shortfall in State contributions to the pension systems. 71
Another found that about 75 percent of the 2013 shortfall, then at $96 billion, was a
result of the legislature failing to make contributions.72 A third source found that
Illinois’ unfunded pension liabilities grew by $115 billion from 1996 to 2018;
considering salary assumptions and benefit changes, benefit payments contributed
less than 0.5 percent to that shortfall.73 This widespread underfunding has also
played out with respect to public safety pension funds established under Article 3
and Article 4 of the Pension Code, notwithstanding the fact that those entities are
funded by municipalities.74 The simple refusal by political entities in Illinois to
adequately contribute to pension funds is the single most decisive cause of the
situation that faces Illinois today.
But government entities also underfund pension funds more subtly, by manipulating
actuarial assumptions. To understand these assumptions, one must first understand
the actuarial methods by which a pension fund’s liabilities are calculated. This article
thus addresses actuarial methods and discusses the calculation and relevance of the
“big numbers” that critics often cite. This article then explains the importance of the
actuarial assumptions used in calculating a funding obligation, and explores how
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funding entities tend to choose assumptions that reduce obligation in the short-term,
regardless of the effect on their obligations in the long-term.

C. Determining Funding
1. Introduction and Terms
A pension plan is a defined benefit plan, meaning that a retiree’s benefit is calculated
by a defined, statutory formula based on his or her final salary and total years of
service, irrespective of the amount of his or her contributions.75 The (projected)
future benefits owed to current employees and retirees—including those who will not
retire for 15, 20, or 25 years—are considered accrued or present liabilities on the
pension fund’s balance sheet to the extent those benefits are attributable to the
employee’s past or present service.76
As to funding mechanisms, Article 3 and 4 pension funds have three sources of
income. First, each employee pays a percentage of his or her salary into the pension
fund.77 Second, the municipality78 contributes an amount calculated on an annual
basis by an actuary.79 Some of these assets are invested consistent with Pension Code
provisions; the returns on these investments are the third source of income for the
pension fund.80 The remainder of the assets are held as cash and used to pay
monthly benefits to retirees and other expenses.81
The municipality’s contribution is calculated annually by an actuary.82 This actuary
may be employed by the Illinois Department of Insurance or retained by the pension
fund or the municipality.83 This calculation takes multiple present-day variables into
account, such as the number and salaries of current employees.84 The actuary must
also make actuarial assumptions about future events, such as the average number of
years each employee will work, the average lifespan of each employee, department
payroll growth, and investment returns.85 Each of these assumptions affects the
calculation of the fund’s unfunded actuarial accrued liabilities; the present value of
the future benefits to be paid to each employee after he or she retires; the portion of
the present value attributable to past years, the current year, and future years; and
other measures.86 A pension fund is considered fully funded with respect to an
employee if it has enough assets to pay the portion of an employee’s anticipated
retirement benefit attributable to the years he or she has already worked, at the time
he or she works them.87 A pension fund is considered fully funded overall if it meets
this standard with respect to all employees and retirees.
The following definitions may be helpful:
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Present Value of Future Benefits: The present-day dollar value of
benefits that will be paid in the future to current participants who are
active, retired, or terminated vested.88
o Actuarial Accrued Liability: Portion of Present Value of Future
Benefits allocated to prior years.89
o Normal Cost: Portion of Present Value of Future Benefits allocated to
the current year.90
o Future Normal Cost: Portion of Present Value of Future Benefits
allocated to future years.91
Unfunded Actuarial Accrued Liabilities: The difference between the
Actuarial Accrued Liability and the actuarial value of the pension fund’s
accrued assets.92 This article refers to this measurement as “unfunded
liability” or “pension debt.”93 When the accrued assets are divided by the
Actuarial Accrued Liability and expressed as a percentage, this is referred
to as the “funding percentage” or “X percent funded.”

“Actuarial accrued liability,” “normal cost,” and “future normal cost” can be
visualized as past, present, and future boxes. Each year an individual works creates
greater benefit (and greater liability for the pension fund) that accrues that year: this
is the second box, the normal cost.94 The benefit accrued from work in previous years
is the first box, which represents actuarial accrued liability.95 This is a liability on the
fund’s balance sheet regardless of when the employee will retire, whether the
benefits come payable two or twenty-five years later. The third box represents the
future normal cost—the benefits that will be earned by the employee’s future work.96
As the individual continues to work, the past box will get bigger and the future box
will get smaller.97
2. Actuarial Cost Method
The method used to calculate the present value of future benefits, the unfunded
actuarial accrued liabilities, and other measures is referred to as the actuarial cost
method.98 There are two actuarial cost methods common to Article 3 and 4 pension
funds; they often yield dramatically different results.99 One method is the “projected
unit credit” (“PUC”) method and the other is the “entry age normal” (“EAN”)
method.100 For EAN, normal cost is reflected as level percent of salary over an
employee’s career.101 This creates a level contribution obligation for the funding
entity.102 By contrast, for PUC, normal cost typically increases as a participant gets
closer to retirement age.103 This creates an upward funding curve in the later years of
an employee’s career and backloads the required contributions attributable to that
employee.104 Thus, compared to EAN, the PUC method prescribes lower
contributions initially, but those contributions increase above EAN levels over the
employee’s career.105
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3. Amortizing Pension Liabilities
When a pension fund has unfunded liabilities, as all funds in Illinois do, the
legislature can require (and has required) the pension fund to reach a certain
funding percentage at a certain time. This is the 90 percent funded by 2040
requirement imposed in 1994.106 To achieve this, pension debt is amortized and a
portion of it included in the pension fund’s yearly request to the municipality until it
is paid off.107 The request to the municipality for an Article 3 or 4 fund is usually
calculated by adding the normal cost for the coming year to the amortized portion of
the amount necessary for the fund to reach 90 percent funded by 2040.108
Pension debt can be amortized as Level Percentage of Payroll or Level Dollar.109
Where payroll growth is zero percent, the two amortization methods yield the same
contribution amounts.110 However, where payroll growth is greater than zero, the
Level Percentage of Payroll method decreases the contribution requirement in the
near future but increases the requirement in the long-term.111 This creates a funding
ramp, similar to the PUC method, in which liability increases year over year. 112 By
contrast, under the Level Dollar method, the same dollar amount of pension debt is
paid every year during the amortization period.113
4. Other Assumptions
An actuary must make two other assumptions: the rate of return the pension fund
will achieve on its investments, and the life expectancy of active members and
retirees.114 These assumptions, especially expected rate of return, are often discussed
by critics and informed the Consolidation Law passed in December 2019.115 If a
higher expected rate of return is set, it is assumed that more money will be made
from investments in the future, which lowers the amount a municipality must
contribute in the present. By contrast, lowering the assumed rate of investment
return by a quarter of a percentage point (from 6.75 percent to 6.5 percent) was
estimated to increase municipalities’ contributions for public safety funds by
between 16 percent and 22 percent.116 Finally, life expectancy assumptions work
intuitively. If a shorter life expectancy is assumed, the required municipal
contribution is lower.117
D. Misstatements and Manipulation Explained
The actuarial calculations detailed above—though, again, wholly appropriate in the
correct context—generate the huge numbers critics use to create a sense of panic.
Recall that pension debt represents the benefits a fund owes for past service
regardless of when those payments will be made. This measure does not distinguish
between the payments a pension fund must make next month and those it must
make next decade. While it would be salutary for a pension fund to hold assets equal
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to all obligations that have been incurred, the failure of a pension fund to hold such
assets is not cause for panic or an indictment of its fiscal health. The same holds true
if a pension fund has a funded ratio of less than 100 percent. Such a fund could easily
make payments for years. A lower funding ratio means that investment returns will
be lower, pushing future contributions higher.118 But ultimately, pension debt does
not represent the danger of missing a payment. As Bill Atwood, executive director of
the Illinois State Board of Investment, stated, “I would say that the likelihood of
Illinois plan participants not getting their retirement benefits is highly remote.”119
To take a real-world example, a report prepared by the actuarial firm Foster & Foster
found that as of January 1, 2019, the Hoffman Estates Firefighters’ Pension Fund
held $84,436,992 in assets, but also had a total accrued liability of $139,313,876.120
That pension fund, therefore, had $54.8 million in pension debt and was 60.6
percent funded.121 These numbers are eye-catching and work to the critics’
advantage.122 Hoffman Estates is a suburb with just over 50,000 people and a
poverty rate of less than 5 percent.123 An unfamiliar reader could easily be led to
believe that Hoffman Estates residents each owe $1,000 that should be paid now to
bring the pension fund into compliance with what it owes, or that pensioners stand
to receive only 60.6 percent of their promised benefits, or that some other economic
catastrophe is looming. And, the unfamiliar reader would note, Hoffman Estates is in
no way economically disadvantaged. But the truth is that the Hoffman Estates
Firefighters Pension Fund is nowhere near missing (or reducing) any benefit
payments. This is a healthy fund. It maintains $84.4 million in assets and pays out
approximately $5.3 million in benefits annually.124 While fewer assets mean fewer
investment opportunities, this fund is nowhere near insolvency.
Additionally, an unfamiliar reader would likely conceive of pension debt as similar to
a home or car loan, as a fixed amount with a fixed payment that he or she will, at
some point, pay down to zero (and the sooner the better). One would not look at a
mortgage statement and say, “Wow, I owe $300,000 on my house and my yearly
salary is only $75,000; this is a crisis!” because one will pay that amount over a long
period of time. Just as this individual can meet his or her bills as they come due, the
pension funds in Illinois, despite decades of underfunding, can make their necessary
benefit payments.125
Looking to the unfunded liability at a single point in time as the only indicator or
measure of the health of a pension system is disingenuous, overly simplistic, and
obscures the many layers of nuance that play into this figure and what it means.126
Low or decreased funding levels say very little about a public pension fund’s longterm stability.127 For this and other reasons, an emphasis on eliminating pension
debt quickly is not recommended by economists.128 Yet a “crisis” narrative has
arisen, possibly from a misunderstanding about what funding ratios reveal about a
pension system’s financial stability.129 Again, the terminology used also plays a part.
“Unfunded liabilities,” for example, is “an ominous new catchphrase . . . that is
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rooted in financial fallacy.”130 Another factor giving the appearance of a “crisis” is the
accounting standards governing public pension plans.131 In addition to generating
large, frightening numbers,132 the Government Accounting Standards Board
(“GASB”) accounting standards misrepresent the health of public pension funds by
resting on a false assumption.133 GASB calculates pension debt based on the
question, if the pension fund closed tomorrow, how much would be needed to pay
out all the promised benefits until the last member dies?134 This question is pivotal in
the private sector where plan sponsors go bankrupt, but it has no application in the
public sector where plan sponsors can levy taxes to fulfill their funding obligations.135
The GASB standards fail to measure progress toward providing benefits when they
are due, exaggerate the problems facing pension funds, steer legislatures toward
misguided solutions, and cost taxpayers and the economy far more than they purport
to save.136 Any clarity the GASB standards bring “comes at the expense of making the
situation seem much more dire than necessary” by ignoring or undermining the
value of the pension plan.137 GASB standards also add billions of dollars to a
government’s deficit.138 All of this unnecessarily increases tension over
policymaking.139
Funding ratios and pension debt should be one tool used to create a funding plan;
they should not be used to frame the debate in a way that generates a widespread
sense of urgency, creates a fear of insolvency, or results in rushed policy decisions
addressing a crisis.140 After all, Illinois pensions have been criticized and deemed
unsustainable for over 50 years and yet have resiliently weathered economic ebbs
and flows.141 At the time of the 1970 Illinois Constitutional Convention, police and
fire pensions were funded at 19 percent and 34 percent, respectively.142 Yet in the
intervening years, not a single pension fund in Illinois has failed to make a payment
due to an inability to pay. It is irresponsible to use pension debt as a scare tactic to
imply a looming catastrophe that does not exist.143
Under metrics other than “pension debt” and “funding percentage,” Illinois’ pension
funds are doing well. The National Conference on Public Employee Retirement
Systems (“NCPERS”) concluded that a pension fund’s fiscal health should be based
upon 1) whether cash inlays from contributions and investment income exceeds
benefit payments in a given year, and 2) whether there is a cushion to weather an
economic downturn.144 Using 2016 data from all 50 states, NCPERS analyzed the top
and bottom states represented by the average funding level of the state’s pension
funds.145 It then compared the four best-funded state funds to the four worst-funded
state funds and examined the number of years in which cash inflows were less than
cash outflows—in other words, how often was there a negative cash flow?146 Illinois
was among the worst states in terms of average funding level.147 However, NCPERS
found no significant difference between the best- and worst-funded states in terms of
frequency of negative inflow years.148 Regardless of funding level, each of the eight
states had between five and eight years in which pension fund income was less than
annual benefits paid, i.e., negative cash flow years.149 Despite having one of the four
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lowest funding ratios, pension funds in Illinois were tied with three other states’ for
the fewest years of negative cash flow.150 It had fewer instances of negative cash flow
than the highest funded state, Wisconsin.151 Year by year, Illinois pension funds take
in sufficient assets to operate and pay benefits, notwithstanding a lower overall
funded level. Finally, addressing public pensions nationally, the study concluded,
“[F]unding status has little correlation with a pension fund’s ability to pay the
promised benefits.”152 The study further concluded, “If left intact, public pension
plans are sustainable, as they have been for decades. . . . Their assets now are higher
than ever before.”153 Thus, regardless of their funding levels, pension funds can
continue to meet obligations in perpetuity so long as they remain cash flow
positive.154 The large, scary numbers thrown around by critics do not stand up to
scrutiny, and the facts do not establish a problem of the magnitude they suggest.
Rather than a crisis, Illinois has a fundamental, long-term problem: it has not
funded its pension obligations. Often the plan sponsor has simply refused to
contribute amounts called for by actuarial principles.155 However, plan sponsors
have also frequently manipulated the actuarial assumptions and methods described
above, or have found an actuary to do that, in order to defer contributions into the
future. The obvious winner in such a situation is the public figure who reduces taxes
or increases spending elsewhere. This imposes a real cost on future public officials,
residents, and the pension funds themselves that is generally ignored.
However, when a fund is less than 100 percent funded, there is a real cost. That fund
has less money to invest, which leads to a lower return on investment. Ironically, the
result is that plan sponsors have to contribute more money in the future to make up
for the shortfalls of the past. Illinois plan funders are constantly on the wrong side of
an “a stitch, in time, saves nine” scenario. And though they are far from the only
offenders, it is worth noting that pension critics who fret about the long-term
solvency of the system rarely advocate for aggressive funding plans that would
benefit future generations out of proportion to any fiscal burden imposed in the
present.
As mentioned, unfortunately, certain municipalities have manipulated actuarial
assumptions to decrease their required contributions to the Article 3 and 4 funds.
The financing provisions of Article 3 and 4 of the Pension Code provide a
municipality a great degree of discretion in calculating its contribution to the
pension funds each year.156 The Code states that the municipality shall levy a tax in
an amount which, when combined with all other revenues, is equal to the normal
cost of the pension fund for the year and the amortized amount which will bring the
pension fund to 90 percent funded in 2040.157 The Code states that the
municipality’s minimum contribution must be determined by an actuary employed
by the Department of Insurance or retained by the pension fund or the municipality
itself.158 The Code also specifies that the minimum contribution shall be calculated
using the PUC method and the Level Percentage of Payroll method,159 the very
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problematic methods that create funding ramps and defer contribution requirements
into the future. Municipalities can and do make contributions greater than this
minimum, including by deferring to the determination of the pension fund’s retained
actuary, but their right to retain their own actuary and to use the methods that
minimize current contributions is explicitly written into the Pension Code. 160 The
municipality raises the necessary money by imposing a property tax.161 If the
municipality fails to forward the necessary contributions, a pension fund may certify
the amount due to the State Comptroller, who intercepts state money otherwise
directed to the municipality and redirects it to the pension fund.162 But this process is
time-consuming and takes a toll on fund-municipality relations.163
In addition to using the PUC method and the Level Percentage of Payroll method,
actuaries often manipulate assumptions related to the rate of return on investment
and life expectancy. Article 3 and 4 pension funds fall into one of four sets of
legislative restrictions as to what they can invest in, based on the overall value of
their assets.164 Pension funds with fewer assets are subject to greater restrictions,
which limits their possible return on investment.165 By setting a higher expected rate
of return on investments, an actuary could reduce a municipality’s required
contribution. For this reason, a decision by a pension board and its actuary to set a
lower expected rate of return is not made lightly, and is made knowing that a
municipality may balk at the greater liability the decision creates. When a booming
market seems to justify a higher expected rate of return, a municipality is reluctant
to lower it to a more realistic number even if the higher rate is not sustainable.
Similarly, while actuaries generally rely on objective life expectancy tables and other
sources to estimate life expectancy for each employee, retiree, and surviving spouse,
actuaries can also produce outdated results. In one case, an actuary intentionally and
wrongly “adjusted” mortality tables to understate future pension liabilities. 166 While
this case is not typical, it highlights the lack of uniformity surrounding these
assumptions and the ability of a municipality or a pension board to “shop” for an
actuary likely to produce a favorable outcome.
E. Governor Pritzker’s 2019 Task Force
Critics are wrong in their assessment of the causes of pension debt in Illinois and
their continued proposals of faulty solutions. But one fact is clear: Illinois’ public
pension funds are “among the worst-funded” in the nation.167 No governor can
ignore that Illinois’ repeated decisions to defer pension fund contributions have
created a situation which, while not a crisis, is untenable in the long-term. These
decisions have decreased the investment returns the funds would have otherwise
realized, necessitating increased municipal contributions. Thus, during his first year
in office, Governor J. B. Pritzker formed a task force to analyze the possibility and
impact of consolidating the investment assets of the 600 Article 3 and 4 pension
funds.168 The individual funds’ abilities to gain returns on their investments is a
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frequently-discussed matter. Obtaining the highest return possible is, in the abstract,
an uncontroversial way to improve the fiscal health of the system.169 Consolidating
all assets, beyond those needed to pay benefits in the near future, might result in
better investment returns and lower costs.170
In its October 2019 report, the task force made two key recommendations.171 First, it
recommended that the assets of Article 3 and Article 4 pension funds be consolidated
into separate statewide authorities for investment purposes.172 Those assets would be
managed by independent boards and invested in a way similar to the assets of the
Illinois Municipal Retirement Fund.173 The task force recommended that, while the
investments would be centrally invested, each fund would maintain an account of its
own assets and liabilities with no fund assets used to pay for the benefits of another
fund.174 The individual Article 3 and 4 funds (“Downstate Funds”) would continue to
manage the administration of benefits, but the Task Force called for continued study
of possible administration consolidation.175
Second, the task force studied the aforementioned Tier Two benefit system that
grants lower benefits to employees hired on or after January 1, 2011.176 The task force
considered the possibility that the lower benefits might violate federal Social Security
law.177 Some employees covered by a public pension plan in Illinois are not required
to pay into the Social Security system, including almost all those covered by Articles
3 and 4.178 The “safe harbor” regulation governing federal Social Security law179
requires that such employees receive a retirement benefit from their public pension
plan that is at least equal to the benefit they would receive under Social Security. 180 If
the benefit is not equal, the public employer is required to increase benefits to the
level of Social Security, or enroll the employee in Social Security and pay retroactive
contributions.181 As the Task Force Report noted, public employers’ liability would
continue to grow if the Tier Two benefits were found to violate the safe harbor
provision, and the accumulated liabilities would have to be repaid in a short time
frame.182 To remedy this issue, the task force recommended increasing Tier Two
benefits by changing calculations for final pensionable salary, cost of living
allowances, and surviving spouse benefits in manners more favorable to
employees.183
III.

PUBLIC ACT 101-0610

Shortly after the pension task force released its report, the Illinois General Assembly
passed a bill largely mirroring its proposals, which Governor Pritzker signed into law
on December 18, 2019 as Public Act 101-0610 (“Consolidation Law”).184 The
Consolidation Law created the Police Officers’ Pension Investment Fund and the
Firefighters’ Pension Investment Fund (“Consolidated Funds”), thus accomplishing
the consolidation contemplated in the Task Force Report.185 Each Consolidated Fund
is charged with investing the assets of the Downstate Funds.186 By June 30, 2022, the
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Consolidated Funds will have taken custody of each Downstate Fund’s investment
assets and authority resulting in an approximately $9.5 billion police pension fund
and a $6.5 billion firefighter pension fund.187 The Consolidated Funds will invest
those assets pursuant to less-restrictive provisions than those that governed the
Downstate Funds.188 The method by which assets are returned to each Downstate
Fund to pay benefits is not made clear but it is anticipated that the fund will develop
operational procedures and guidelines to do so.
Under the Consolidation Law, the Downstate Funds will still exist to perform all
their other functions, including adjudicating disability cases, verifying continued
eligibility for benefits, and formally accepting new members. Every Downstate Fund
will have its own account with the Consolidated Fund.189 Investment gains and losses
will be attributed to each Downstate Fund pro rata.190 Each Downstate Fund will not
have access to the assets attributed to another Downstate Fund.191 The initial costs of
consolidation will be financed by a $7.5 million loan to each Consolidated Fund from
the Illinois Finance Authority.192 However, the assets held for investment purposes
are held in accounts outside the State Treasury.193
The Consolidation Law creates a transition period beginning on January 1, 2020,
and ending June 30, 2022, by which time all Downstate Funds will have transferred
their investment assets and investment authority to the appropriate Consolidated
Fund.194 Before this transfer is made, each Consolidated Fund, through its Board of
Trustees, will engage a certified public accountant to audit the investment assets of
each Downstate Fund.195 Once a Downstate Fund’s assets are audited, the
Consolidated Fund will provide it with a certified investment asset list and the
Downstate Fund may not purchase or sell investment assets.196 Each Consolidated
Fund’s executive director will later give notice to the Downstate Fund of the
Consolidated Fund’s intent to assume control of the investment assets and the date it
will do so.197
As with the Article 3 and 4 funds, each Consolidated Fund will be governed by a
Board of Trustees (“Board”).198 Each Board has nine trustees.199 Five of these are
“employee-side,” being elected by employees or beneficiaries or appointed from lists
provided by employee unions; the other four are “employer-side.”200 A simple
majority of five votes is enough to pass most motions.201 However, establishing a
quorum and passing certain important types of motions require six votes.202 The
adoption of actuarial assumptions, asset allocation policies, and investment policies
are among the crucial matters for which six votes are required.203
Each Board has significant operational authority. The Consolidation Law gives each
Board the authority to hire an investment manager.204 Additionally, each Board may
hire an executive director in charge of its operation and administration.205 Each
Board may also appoint one or more custodians for its assets.206 The Board or the
executive director may also employ legal counsel, independent auditors, and other
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experts and set the compensation of those employed.207 Each Consolidated Fund is
subject to an independent audit by a CPA selected by the Board six months after the
end of the transition period,208 and each will be audited at least annually
thereafter.209
Several matters remain to be standardized in the operation of the funds; these
include certain timelines such as when the auditing process will begin and details
such as the order in which the Downstate Funds’ assets will be audited. The Boards
must all address the mechanism by which they will distribute money to Downstate
Funds to pay benefits,210 and whether municipal contributions shall be paid directly
to the Consolidated Funds. The Consolidation Law gives each Board considerable
rule-making authority, including regarding the transition process, transfer of funds
to the Downstate Funds, and how municipal contributions “may, but are not
required to, be directly transferred to the fund.”211
Of course, the Consolidation Law exists primarily to change the law governing
investment of Article 3 and 4 assets to obtain a higher rate of return. It addresses
this by eliminating the investment restrictions that currently govern Article 3 and 4
funds.212 Specifically, the Consolidation Law states that the Consolidated Funds shall
not be subject to the limitations applicable to Article 3 and 4 funds that limited the
Downstate Funds’ ability to invest more than 65 percent of their assets (or less for
Downstate Funds with fewer assets) in equities.213 The Consolidation Law does
impose some investment restrictions on the Consolidated Fund, but these are of a
different nature.214
Another significant provision of the Consolidation Law—and one not contemplated
in the Task Force Report—is the removal of actuarial assumptions from the
municipalities’ influence. The Consolidation Law accomplishes this by addressing
the annual actuarial report used as the basis for the municipalities’ contributions to
the Downstate Fund.215 It provides that after the transition period, the report used
shall be the report prepared by an auditor engaged by each Consolidated Fund. 216
The Consolidation Law thus removes from each municipality the power to hire the
actuary who makes the assumptions upon which the contribution demand is
based.217 If a municipality was ever so inclined, it may no longer seek out actuaries
who inappropriately reduce present-day municipal contributions by using certain
assumptions. Instead, the new Consolidated Funds will use their own actuary to
determine the required annual contribution for each municipality, thereby bringing
a degree of objectivity and uniformity to the required assumptions.218
Finally, the Consolidation Law corrects some of the harmful effects of the Tier Two
benefit reduction. Most significantly, the Consolidation Law corrects the Tier Two
benefits provision to avoid any potential federal Social Security law violation. Under
Tier Two cost of living adjustments for pension recipients were limited to one-half of
the consumer price index (“CPI”) or 3 percent, whichever was lower.219 The
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Consolidation Law changes this to the CPI itself or 3 percent, whichever is lower. 220
The Consolidation Law also increases benefits for survivors of Tier II pension
recipients221 and changes the calculation of final pensionable salary in a way
favorable to employees.222
The Tier Two benefit enhancements are not projected to create great liability. The
task force opined that the enhancements would cost less than 10 percent of the
increased investment resulting from consolidation:
While the fixes to Tier 2 benefits for suburban and downstate police and fire
plans will have some associated cost, that cost is minimal in proportion to the
improved investment returns resulting from consolidation. On average and
over a five-year period, the recommended fixes to Tier 2 benefits are
estimated to offset between $70 and $95 million of the $820 million to $2.5
billion (3-9%) in investment return gains, and avoids a potential and costly
safe harbor violation.223
Data regarding these costs have not been compiled, other than in the Task Force
Report, but it appears unlikely that the cost of the increased Tier Two benefits will
exceed 10 percent of the expected gains from increased investment returns through
consolidation.224
The Consolidation Law could increase the overall funding levels of the Downstate
Funds, both by obtaining a higher return on investment with the assets pooled, 225
and by saving significant costs on hiring individual investment managers.226
However, giving control of the actuarial assumptions to each Board may have the
most beneficial effect of all, as actuarial assumptions will no longer aid in the
effective postponement of liabilities into the future.227 The fact that the task force
report did not recommend this measure, but political leaders included it, may also
indicate that there is now political willpower to confront the funding problem
honestly in the present, instead of deferring it to the future.
IV.

CHALLENGES GOING FORWARD

Public-sector employee pension systems in Illinois will face challenges going
forward. Decades of underfunding cannot be undone with a single Consolidation
Law. But the Law itself is an encouraging development. Challenges remain, however.
Those challenges include a new global pandemic and the various strains of
continuing, decades-old opposition to appropriate pension funding.
A. COVID-19
As this article is being written, the COVID-19 pandemic ravages the country. The
Dow Jones Industrial Average (and other stock market indices) reflects the damage
done to equities markets, falling from 29,276.82 on February 10, 2020228 to
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18,591.93 on March 23229 before rising to 25,383.11 on May 29.230 Article 3 and 4
pension funds are permitted to invest up to 65 percent of their assets in equities, 231
and most do so to capture the greatest return on investment. Unfortunately, this
means that most Article 3 and 4 pension funds have lost asset value and may
continue to do so. Though not explicitly stated, it is likely, that the Consolidated
Funds will invest more than 65 percent of investment assets in equities, rather than
fixed income instruments such as government bonds.232 In that case, a future
downturn like the one associated with COVID-19 would cause even more lost value
to the Illinois pension system.
In response to the COVID-19 pandemic, Congress enacted several relief measures,
including, the CARES (Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security) Act, effective
March 27, 2020.233 The CARES Act provided $139 billion in relief to be divided
among state and local governments based on population.234 This relief is restricted to
necessary expenditures incurred due to COVID-19, which were not accounted for in
the state budget most recently approved as of March 27, 2020, and which were
incurred between and including March and December of 2020.235 Illinois received
$4.9 billion, with $3.5 billion going to the state itself and $1.4 billion directly going
to five large counties and the City of Chicago.236 Whether any of this aid will go to
state or local pension systems is not clear. The CARES act does not address public
employee pensions.237 A review of the Treasury Department’s guidance does not
yield a clear answer.238 However, a Treasury Department statement clarified that due
to the emergency nature of the situation, a state or local government “may presume
that payroll costs for public health and public safety employees are payments for
services substantially dedicated to mitigating or responding to the COVID-19 public
health emergency” and therefore are permissible under the CARES Act.239 It appears,
then, that CARES Act aid may be used to support Illinois’ pension systems if Illinois’
leaders choose to put the funds to that use.240 Regardless, any aid given to
municipalities would indirectly support the funding of pensions because it would
open up general fund revenue to pay the required contributions. Reimbursement to
municipalities means money available to the pensions.
COVID-19-related aid explicitly intended for troubled pension plans is an idea being
considered for the next COVID-19 relief act.241 On May 15, 2020 the House passed
another relief measure, the Heroes Act would increase the solvency of multiemployer plans and repeal some previous benefit suspensions.242 However, the
White House has already pledged to veto the Heroes Act.243
B. Ideological Opposition
Another continuing challenge for pension funds will be the ideological struggle
against the critics’ attempt to erase pension benefits, including by misrepresenting
the fiscal health of the pension systems and the benefits the retirees receive. This
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attempt will receive a new rationalization every time an event of real or asserted
economic importance occurs. Thus, in addition to its economic impact, COVID-19
has also provided a rhetorical backdrop for additional attacks on pensions. In April,
Illinois Senate President Don Harmon (D-Oak Park) wrote to Illinois’ congressional
representatives and asked for, inter alia, $10 billion in COVID-19 relief for the state’s
pension funds.244 Because the assets of most pension funds are heavily invested in a
stock market that has recently plummeted, this money was badly needed and would
offset an unanticipated economic decline. As Harmon clarified, “The massive
negative effects [of COVID-19] to state and local economies across this country have
not been addressed and need to be.”245
For some reason, those who frequently decry the asserted ill health of the Illinois
pension system also opposed the use of federal money to help that system. In an
open letter to Harmon, U.S. Representative Darin LaHood (R-Peoria) claimed that
“Illinois must reform its pension system to reduce long-term liabilities and make the
system more equitable to the people of Illinois before federal money is used to
support the pension system.”246 Rather than allocate the federal money to a pension
system that has been (1) underfunded continuously for decades and (2) hit hard by a
stock market downturn, LaHood suggested that the money be given directly to the
cities.247 LaHood did not explain how “reduc[ing] long-term liabilities” would “make
the system more equitable,” unless he believes that public-sector employees should
join the many private sector workers whose pension benefits have already been
devastated.
But LaHood’s reaction was measured compared to others. The general reaction of
Republicans was described as “furious.”248 The Chicago Tribune Editorial Board
referred to Harmon’s request as “shameless,” “dishonest,” and “galling”; referred to
the pension system as an “obvious drain on resources” and a “financial hellhole”;
failed to address the effect of the Coronavirus-related recession on investment
assets; and ignored the rights of pension recipients.249 A welcome counterweight
came, surprisingly, from Crain’s, which acknowledged the need for Coronavirus
relief for pension systems like Illinois’.250 But this perspective should not be
controversial. Pension funds rely on investment returns as a source of income. When
the stock market goes down, even temporarily, the current value of pension fund
assets and expected returns both decrease. This increases unfunded liability, which
is presumptively the enemy of many of the critics. So the pension funds can either
seek increased municipal contributions during a recession, when a municipality is
likely to receive less tax revenue, or they can receive third-party payments from the
federal government. And as is always the case with pension funds, increased
payments now will eliminate the need for greater payments in the future. Despite the
fiscal soundness of this argument, it does not seem to be popular with those who
preach fiscal soundness.
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C. Employer-Fund Relationships
One aspect of Article 3 and 4 funding unaffected by the Consolidation Law is the
mechanics by which each Downstate Fund receives its municipal contribution. The
task of ensuring that a municipality actually makes its required contribution is
unaffected by the Consolidation Law; it therefore remains with the local pension
board.251 If a municipality fails to make its required contribution, the pension fund
may file a complaint. The pension fund would fight an uphill battle, however; the
Illinois Supreme Court has held that the question of how a pension fund is funded is
a political one, and courts will not take action to protect beneficiaries unless the fund
is on the verge of default or imminent bankruptcy.252 An Article 3 or 4 fund might
reach a settlement with a delinquent municipality, but in that case would almost
certainly settle for less than its statutory entitlement, years after that money was due,
in a settlement agreement that the municipality might later breach.253
One provision in both Articles 3 and 4 provides that if a municipality fails to make its
required contribution, the pension board may certify the amount delinquent to the
State Comptroller, who is tasked with intercepting state funds intended for the
municipality and redirecting them to the pension fund.254 But this “intercept”
provision also leads to lengthy legal proceedings. The pension fund-claimant must
formally notify the Comptroller of the amount delinquent.255 “[A]s soon as is
practicable” thereafter, the Comptroller must give notice to the municipality.256 The
municipality then has 60 days to contest the amount owed.257 If it does, the
Comptroller may seek more information from the pension fund, who is given 90
days to respond.258 Once he or she has all the information necessary, the Comptroller
issues a decision entitling the pension fund to a warrant for some, all, or none of
what it has claimed.259 As an administrative decision, the Comptroller’s decision is
subject to administrative review under the Administrative Review Law.260 Therefore,
while this process appears streamlined, it is still subject to lengthy court proceedings
if a municipality chooses to challenge any aspect of the Comptroller’s decision.
Therefore, every legal avenue an Article 3 or 4 fund has against an undercontributing
municipality is relatively slow, inefficient, and contributes to friction between the
pension fund and the municipality.261 Finally, an award against a municipality might
necessitate enforcement proceedings before a pension fund can actually recover what
it is owed.262
By contrast, the process authorized for the Illinois Municipal Retirement Fund
(“IMRF”), the pension system of municipal elected officials and non-sworn
employees, is swift and certain. The IMRF essentially sends a receipt to each
municipality, detailing the money it has already intercepted for the municipality’s
share of contributions to IMRF.263 In light of the fact that municipal underfunding is
the reason Article 3 and 4 funds are inadequately funded, the failure to provide a
stronger intercept provision in the Consolidation Law similar to what the IMRF
enjoys appears to be a missed opportunity.
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Underfunded Article 3 and 4 funds in economically distressed municipalities will
continue to face challenges not addressed by the Consolidation Law. Indeed, the
Consolidation Law explicitly states that assets will not be shared among Downstate
Funds: each Downstate Fund will have its own “account” with each Consolidated
Fund and no Downstate Fund will be credited with assets at the expense of
another.264 Additionally, whether an Illinois municipality could file for federal
bankruptcy is unclear, and it is also unclear what would happen to the pension
benefits payable from the associated Article 3 and 4 funds.265 The Consolidation Law
addresses this challenge only to the extent that eventual, expected greater returns on
investment, and actuarial assumptions not made by the municipality, will place such
pension funds in a better economic position.
D. Tax Collection and Public Opinion
Illinois’ tax system also represents a challenge, for multiple reasons. First, the state is
only one of seven that has a flat personal income tax rate, rather than a graduated
tax rate which applies a higher marginal rate to higher incomes.266 This flat income
tax rate is enshrined in Illinois’ Constitution.267 A proposal to amend the constitution
to eliminate this provision will appear on the ballot in November 2020.268 If the
proposal passes, Illinois would have the authority to apply a higher marginal income
tax rate. This might alleviate some of Illinois’ budget concerns, but there is no
indication that any revenue would go toward any pension system, let alone an Article
3 or 4 system.
Second, Article 3 and 4 prescribe that municipal contributions to pension funds
should be funded by property taxes.269 This has not changed under the new
Consolidation Law. Property taxes are the most conspicuous form of taxes. Income
taxes are deducted individuals’ paychecks, “depriving” them of money that they
never had and are unlikely to miss. Sales taxes are imposed when a person is already
purchasing something and merely “deprive” the purchaser of a small fraction of the
purchase price. Income and sales taxes are relatively subtle in this regard.
By contrast, a property tax imposes a cost that is neither a subtle reduction in
income nor a minor fraction of an overall cost. Property taxes force tax payers to
open their wallets specifically to pay that tax. Property taxes intrude upon their lives
and demand they pay money that they likely intended to spend some other way.
Funding a government program by property taxes likely makes that program less
popular. Further, property values and rates of non-payment of property taxes vary
considerably across the state and are dramatically affected by income inequality,
leading to decreased funding in troubled communities. Finally, tying a program to a
property tax makes it a candidate to be cut if and when the tax itself is cut.
Since the property-tax-funding provisions of Article 3 and 4 are generally not
enforced, it might be helpful to further deviate from this funding method, as some
municipalities already have, and impose other income or sales taxes to generate the
revenue to pay required contributions. Actions such as these should have a beneficial
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impact on the funded levels of those pension funds, without incurring further voter
frustration.

V. CONCLUSION
Illinois’ pension funds, including Article 3 and 4 pension funds, are not on the brink
of failure. They are not a crisis. They are not an extreme burden. And the numbers
trotted out as scare tactics are not accurate measures of the pension system’s health
in the present or even the near future. However, serious underfunding problems
have plagued the systems historically. The Consolidation Law will ameliorate
problems to some degree, by generating greater returns on investment and by
prohibiting untenable actuarial assumptions. But decades of underfunding will not
be solved by a single law with a gradual effect. A serious political commitment must
be made to funding pensions, with the knowledge that money paid now will generate
investment returns and thus result in lower payments in the future. Whether the
political will exists to allow greater enforcement of funding contributions remains to
be seen.
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Joe Cahill, Pritzker’s Pension Silence Speaks Volumes, CRAIN’S CHI. BUS. (Nov. 16, 2018), https://www.chicagobusiness.com/joe-cahillbusiness/pritzkers-pension-silence-speaks-volumes.
7

Schuster, Amend, supra note 1. The “situation” referred to is failing to amend the Illinois Constitution to remove the Pension Protection
Clause. See infra, note 14 and accompanying text.
8

Schuster, Amend asserts that pensions are causing a crisis in Illinois. Schuster attributes this to “a combination of factors,”
including “overpromising”. This is inaccurate. As demonstrated at length infra, notes 30-48 and accompanying text, pension benefits in
Illinois are modest and are not outliers in terms of expense or generosity. The benefit level itself contributes very little to the fiscal problems
associated with the pension system. The problem is not “overpromising”, it is primarily the failure of plan sponsors to meet their financing
obligations, a form of self-sabotage that merely necessitates higher contributions in the future. See infra, notes 49-74 and accompanying
text.

SUMMER 2020

ILLINOIS PUBLIC EMPLOYEE RELATIONS REPORT

25

9

See e,g., id. at 17 (calling for increasing the retirement age, capping the maximum pensionable salary, replacing the annual 3% benefit
increase with a COLA tied to inflation and suspending COLAs to allow inflation to catch up to prior year increases).
Austin Berg, The 1%: Illinois’ Pension Millionaires, ILLI. POL’Y (Jan. 23, 2020), https://www.illinoispolicy.org/the-1-illinoispension-millionaires/ (hereinafter Berg, 1%). The article does not mention that this $1 million is received slowly, over the course of
years, and that a pensioner who received $40,000 a year over the course of 25 years would fall under the “1%” designation the article
creates. Presumably, a delivery driver who earns $40,000 a year but works for 25 years is also a “millionaire” according to the IPI.
10

11

Id.

12

Id.

13

This framing of the issue also assumes, rather oddly, that public employee pensions are not part of the social safety net. In any case, the
critics tend to align themselves with a political philosophy that advocates for lower taxes and lower government spending, so their stated
concern with the social safety net rings hollow.
14

ILL. CONST. 1970, art. XIII, § 5. Research by Eric Madiar, who served as chief legal counsel for the Office of the Illinois Senate President,
indicated that the framers of the 1970 Illinois Constitution, and the delegates to the convention that led to the same, “had a deep
understanding of both the fiscal condition and legal landscape governing public pensions.” One letter read at the debates stated the
legislature’s failure to fund the pension systems, not the benefits that beneficiaries received, “has created … a staggering liability for future
taxpayers.” The framers’ intent in adding the pension protection clause was to prohibit the legislature from diminishing an employee’s
pension benefits once that employee had entered the system, including by pointing to the liability imposed on future taxpayers. The voters
who ratified the clause did so under a belief that mirrored the framer’s intent. See Eric Madiar, Is Welching on Public Pension Promises
an Option for Illinois? An Analysis of Article XIII, Section 5 of the Illinois Constitution, 48 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 167, 172 (2014)
(hereinafter Madiar, Option).
15

Schuster, Amend, supra note 1.

16

Id. These laws generally accomplish this by raising the retirement age or reducing cost of living allowances.

It is important to note that if the critics’ contemplated benefit reductions ever became law, the existing pension debt—scary numbers like
$133.5 billion—would not be affected. Pension debt refers to accrued liability, which relates to work already performed. The benefits
earned prior to a benefit-reducing law would not be affected by that law. Thus, the critics could reduce benefits and then claim that the sky
is falling because pension debt would not be reduced. See infra, note 22-23 and accompanying text.
17

Schuster, Amend, supra note 1 (saving $1.1 billion of $133 billion pension debt). A related aim, advocated by Schuster and the IPI, is
to “right-size” the state’s union contracts and otherwise infringe on public-sector union bargaining rights, which would transfer $4.2 billion
from unionized employees to their employers over five years. Id.
18

Public Act 96-0889.

19

Id.

20

Id. For an explanation of how the Tier Two changes may have violated federal social security law, see infra, note 177 et seq. and
accompanying text.
“Article 3” pension funds are those established by a government entity to pay the pension benefits of retired police officers. See 40 ILCS
5/3-101 et seq. “Article 4” pension funds are for firefighters. See 40 ILCS 5/4-101 et seq.
21

“Funding percentage” refers to the ratio of assets a pension fund has to liabilities attributable to employee service already rendered. See
infra, Section I.C.i. An employee’s eventual entitlement to benefits is accounted for in a pension fund’s liability as soon as he or she starts
accumulating service time, and therefore the lower benefits eventually payable to Tier Two employees are already part of each pension
fund’s current liabilities. In other words, even though the individuals eligible for lower Tier Two benefits will not retire for another twelve
years, the lower liability associated with those employees is reflected in the Article 3 and 4 funds’ current liability.
22

23

COMMISSION ON GOVERNMENT FORECASTING AND ACCOUNTABILITY, REPORT ON THE FINANCIAL CONDITION OF THE DOWNSTATE
POLICE & DOWNSTATE FIRE PENSION FUNDS IN ILLINOIS (P.A. 95-0950) at 7-8 (2019), http://cgfa.ilga.gov/Upload/
2019FinancialConditionDownstatePoliceFire.pdf.
ROBERT BRUNO, AMANDA KASS & DAVID MERRIMAN, A ‘PENSION CRISIS’ MENTALITY WON’T HELP: THINKING DIFFERENTLY
ABOUT
ILLINOIS’
RETIREMENT
SYSTEMS
iv
(Feb.
19,
2019),
https://igpa.uillinois.edu/sites/igpa.uillinois.edu
/files/reports/PensionReport.pdf (hereinafter Bruno, Mentality).
24

25

Id.

ROBERT BRUNO & FRANK MANZO, WORKING IN ILLINOIS’ PUBLIC INTEREST: A COMPARISON STUDY ON EARNINGS, BENEFITS, AND
IMPACTS,
14
(Mar.
12,
2013),
https://ler.illinois.edu/wp-content/uploads/2015/01/Working-in-Illinois-PublicInterest_Bruno-Manzo.pdf (hereinafter Bruno & Manzo, Working); ILLINOIS PENSION CONSOLIDATION FEASIBILITY TASK FORCE,
REPORT TO GOVERNOR JB PRITZKER, 4 (Oct. 10, 2019) https://ippfa.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/2070126
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Report_by_the_Pension_Consolidation_Feasibility_Task_Force.pdf (hereinafter “Task Force Report”). For an explanation of how
the Tier Two changes may have violated federal social security law, see infra, note 177-82. and accompanying text.
27

Bruno & Manzo, Working, supra note 26, at 4.

28

While no Article 3 or 4 fund is on the verge of insolvency, there are some which could be considered troubled. These are found in
municipalities that have long-term, widespread economic difficulty, such as Harvey and East St. Louis. An analysis of the problems faced
by these communities is beyond the scope of this article, but the extent of those problems suggests pension funds are not to blame.
Rahm Emanuel, Let’s Make Sure This Crisis Doesn’t Go to Waste, WASH. POST (Mar.
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2020/03/25/lets-make-sure-this-crisis-doesnt-go-waste/.
29

25,

2020),

See generally Jeffrey R. Brown & Richard F. Dye, Illinois Pensions in a Fiscal Context: A (Basket) Case Study 1 (Nat’l Bur. Econ. Res.
Working Paper 21293, June 2015), https://www.nber.org/papers/w21293.pdf (hereinafter “Brown & Dye, Context”).
30

31

Id.

32

Bruno & Manzo, Working, supra note 26, at 2.

Id. at 2, 8. It is worth noting that 51.8% of state and local government workers in Illinois hold Bachelor’s degrees, compared to just
30.5% of private sector workers.
33

Bruno & Manzo note that public-sector employees in Illinois tend to earn slightly more than their private sector counterparts among
employees with less education. When examining highly-educated employees, private sector employees earn significantly more than their
public-sector counterparts. Id. at 9. Further, the distribution of income is more egalitarian in the public-sector. Id. at 10. Bruno & Manzo
explore additional benefits of public employment in Illinois, including less reliance on the Earned Income Tax Credit and greater racial
and gender parity than the private sector, Id. at 10-11, but these are beyond the scope of this article.
Finally, Bruno & Manzo note an illuminating trend in Illinois. From the end of the recession in mid-2009 to 2013, when Bruno & Manzo,
Working was written, real Illinois GDP grew, but the number of public sector state employees declined. Id. at 6-7. This calls into question
the need for a crisis mentality in dealing with the problem of pension funding.
34

Bruno & Manzo, Working, supra note 26, at 3; Brown & Dye, Context, supra note 30, at 1. Brown & Dye considered theoretical retirees
and found that their pension in Illinois would be 25th most out of 50 states, or in another case 27th most out of 46 states. Id. at 4-5. The cost
of living allowances can drive Illinois pensions higher later in a pensioner’s life, but those benefits are required by the fact that Illinois
pensioners generally do not receive Social Security benefits. Id at 1-2. Additionally, even considering the cost of living allowances, Brown
& Dye concluded, “[T]here is little evidence that Illinois is more generous than other states with higher funding ratios [indicating betterfunded pension funds].” Id. at 4-5.
35

Bruno & Manzo, Working, supra note 26, at 12. The average state and local government employee earns $44,042 in wages in Illinois
and $44,615 nationwide excluding Illinois. When pension and healthcare benefits are included, Illinois state government employees earn
only $60,292, far less than the national average for state employees of $69,108.
36

Id.

37

Id. at 6.

38

Id. at 13. Illinois employees contribute 7 to 9.5% of their salaries to their respective pension funds.

39

Id. at 14.

40

Andrew G. Biggs, Not So Modest: Pension Benefits for Full-Career State Government Employees, AEI ECON. PERSPECTIVES 2 (Mar.
2014), https://www.aei.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/03/-aei-economic-perspective-march-2014_160053300510.pdf.
While Illinois pension benefits are average, their cost to employers is somewhat higher. See Bruno & Manzo, Working, supra note 26, at
2.
Biggs’s article also addresses the “pension millionaires.” Unlike Berg’s article, supra note 10, Biggs at least clarifies that these individuals
receive $1 million gradually, over the course of their retirements. Of course, by this standard, almost anyone is a millionaire, including
someone who makes a modest $50,000 salary and works for twenty years.
41

Bruno & Manzo, Working, supra note 26, at 14.

42

Id. Nationally, 25% of state and local government employees are not covered by social security. In Illinois, 45.4% of all public employees
do not receive social security benefits, including the police officers and firefighters covered by Article 3 and 4.
43

Brown & Dye, Context, supra note 31.

44

Bruno & Manzo, Working, supra note 26, at 19.

ILANA BOIVIE, PENSIONOMICS 2018: MEASURING THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF DB PENSION EXPENDITURES 14 (Nat’l Retirement Sec.
Inst., Dec., 2018), https://www.nirsonline.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/Pensionomics2018_final.pdf.
45

46

Id. at 19, fig. 4.
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Bruno & Manzo, Working, supra note 26, at 18.

48

Id.

49

Brown & Dye, Context, supra note 31, at 2.

27

50

Id. at 2, 6. Public employees have at all times made 100% of the contributions required from them via deductions from their paychecks.
See Bruno & Manzo, supra note 26, at 13. Additionally, “Public employees have historically paid their fair share of the normal cost of
benefits through payroll deductions.” See Madiar, Option, supra note, at 1.
51

Brown & Dye, Context, supra note 31, at 6.

52

Id. (emphasis added).

53

Id. at 13.

54

Id.

55

Id.

56

Eric Madiar, Illinois Public Pension Reform: What's Past is Prologue, 31 ILL. PUB. EMP. REL. REP. Summer, 2014, at 12 (hereinafter
Madiar, Prologue).
57

Brown & Dye, Context, supra note 310, at 14; CRAIG MARTIN ET AL, ILLINOIS PENSION LAW HANDBOOK 8 (Jenner & Block Practice
Series, 2012), https://jenner.com/system/assets/assets/6852/original/2012_20IL_20Pension_20Handbook_20-_20FINAL.pdf (hereinafter
Martin, Handbook). Article 3 and 4 pension funds, which are the focus of this article, must reach 90% funded by 2040. 40 ILCS 5/3-125;
40 ILCS 5/4-118.
58

Brown & Dye, Context, supra note 310, at 14.

59

Grotto & Long, Digging, supra note 4, at 3; Bruno, Mentality, supra note 24, at 19

60

Grotto & Long, Digging, supra note 4, at 3.

61

Grotto & Long, Digging, supra note 4, at 3; Bruno, Mentality, supra note 24, at 18.

62

Bruno, Mentality, supra note 24, at 186

63

Hinz, Defusing, supra note 2.

64

Brown & Dye, Context, supra note 31, at 14.

65

Id.

66

Bruno & Manzo, Working, supra note 26, at 13.

67

Grotto & Long, Digging, supra note 4; Adam Schuster, Shell Game: Chicago Considers Plan to Borrow $10B to Pay Off Pension Debt,
ILLI. POL’Y (August 9, 2018), https://www.illinoispolicy.org/shell-game-chicago-considers-plan-to-borrow-10b-to-pay-offpension-debt. As Grotto & Long, Digging, explained, “In recent years, the Legislature twice passed laws that allowed the state to borrow
an additional $7.2 billion, this time to help make regular pension contributions. That means [that between 2003 and 2011], the state has
borrowed $17.2 billion to make pension contributions that weren't even enough to keep the debt from growing, according to the
Commission on Government Forecasting and Accountability. Including $13.6 billion in interest on the bonds, the borrowing will add a
total of $30.8 billion to the state's pension debt.”
68

Bruno, Mentality, supra note 24, at 8 (citing Teachers’ Retirement System, 2017 Comprehensive Annual Financial Report (2017)

69

Brown & Dye, Context, supra note 31, at 7 (emphasis added).

70

See infra, note 893 and accompanying text, for an explanation of this term.

71

Madiar, Option, supra note14, at 2.

72

Bruno & Manzo, Working, supra note 26, at 3.

73

Bruno, Mentality, supra note 24, at 7-8. During this period, benefit changes contributed $5.42 billion to the shortfall. Id. at 8. However,
salary increases less than assumed decreased the shortfall by $5.06 billion. Id. Therefore, only $360 million of the $115 billion shortfall is
attributable to more generous benefits.
74

Martin, Handbook, supra note 57, at 4.

75

40 ILCS 5/3-111; 40 ILCS 5/4-109; Martin, Handbook, supra note 57, at 11; Natalya Shnitser, Funding Discipline for U.S. Public
Pension Plans, 100 IOWA L. REV. 663, 667 (2015) (hereinafter Shnitser, Discipline).
76

Bruno, Mentality, supra note 24, at 4. As explained further infra, this means that the pension fund is expected to have some money now
to pay pensions that will not even begin to be paid for 15, 20, or 25 years.
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77

40 ILCS 5/3-125.1; 40 ILCS 5/4-118.1; Martin, Handbook, supra note 57, at 3-5. The deductions taken from the salaries of police
officers and firefighters have increased over time. Police officers prior to 1943 only contributed 1% of their salary; by 1971 they were
contributing 7%; now they contribute 9.91%. 40 ILCS 5/3-125.1. Similarly, firefighters contributed just 6.955% of their salary until 1975;
now, they contribute 9.455%. 40 ILCS 5/4-118.1. These increased contributions are rarely mentioned by critics of pension benefits.
78

Some Illinois municipalities are served by a Fire Protection District. In that case, it is the Fire Protection District that creates the pension
fund and that has the funding obligation. Hereinafter, references to a municipality should be understood to include a Fire Protection District.
79

40 ILCS 5/3-125; 40 ILCS 5/4-118; Bruno, Mentality, supra note 24, at 4; Martin, Handbook., supra note 57, at 3.

80

40 ILCS 5/3-135; 40 ILCS 5/4-128.

81

Shnitser, Discipline, supra note 75, at 669; Gabriel Roeder Smith & Co., 2017 Actuarial Assumptions Review For Fund Fiscal Years
2011 through 2016, State of Ill. Dept. of Insurance I-4 (2017), https://insurance.illinois.gov/Applications/Pension/Default.aspx
(hereinafter GRS, Assumptions).
82

40 ILCS 5/3-125; 40 ILCS 5/4-118; Martin, Handbook, supra note 57, at 6; GRS, supra note 81, at I-2 (describing the actuarial
assumptions comprising annual contributions).
83

40 ILCS 5/3-125; 40 ILCS 5/4-118.

84

Martin, Handbook, supra note 57, at 6; GRS, Assumptions, supra note 81, at I-2.

85

Martin, Handbook, supra note 57, at 6; GRS, Assumptions, supra note 81, at I-2; Jason Franken, Basic Funding Concepts 12 , paper
presented at the 2017 Illinois Public Pension Fund Ass’n Annual Pension Conference) (copy on file with author) (hereinafter Franken,
Concepts).
86

Franken, Concepts, supra note 85, at 12; Gabriel Roeder Smith & Co., Wisconsin Retirement System Entry Age Normal Cost Method
2 (December 2016) (hereinafter GRS, Cost Method).
87

Franken, Concepts, supra note 85, at 12; GRS, Cost Method, supra note 86, at 2.

Franken, Concepts, supra note 85, at 14; GRS, Cost Method, supra note 86, at 3. An individual is “terminated vested” if he or she has
worked enough creditable service time to be eligible for a pension and has retired, but is not yet old enough to receive a pension. For
example, an Article 4 firefighter cannot receive a retirement pension unless he or she has 20 years creditable service and is age 50 or older.
40 ILCS 5/4-109. A firefighter who retires at age 48 with 22 years service is terminated vested.
88

89

GRS, Cost Method, supra note 86, at 3; Franken, Concepts, supra note 85, at 14. For example, if an employee has worked five years, is
projected to retire after 30 years, and is projected to receive a pension and live for 25 years after retirement, one-sixth of all 25 years of his
pension is considered actuarial accrued liability.
Id. In the example supra, note 89, the employee’s normal cost would be one-thirtieth of his total pension. See also PAUL ANGELO &
TOM LOWMAN, ACTUARIAL FUNDING POLICIES AND PRACTICES FOR PUBLIC PENSION PLANS 11 (Conference of Consulting Actuaries,
Public
Plans
Community
White
Paper,
Oct.,
2014),
https://www.ccactuaries.org/Portals/0/pdf/
CCA_PPC_White_Paper_on_Public_Pension_Funding_Policy.pdf (hereinafter Angelo & Lowman, Policies).
90

91

Franken, Concepts, supra note 85, at 14; GRS, Cost Method, supra note 86, at;. In the note 89 example, four-fifths of all 25 years of the
employee’s pension would be future normal cost.
92

Id.

93

Id.

94

Martin, Handbook, supra note 57, at 11; GRS, Cost Method, supra note 86, at 6 (making a similar analogy).

95

GRS, Cost Method, supra note 86, at 4.

96

Id. at 5. As part of this calculation, an actuary will have to make assumptions about how long the employee will work. And for all three
boxes, an actuary will have to make other assumptions: how long will the employee live after retirement? Will his or her spouse, if any,
outlive the employee? Will the employee become disabled from service? And so on.
97

Id. at 6.

98

Id. at 3; Franken, Concepts, supra note 85, at 14.

99

Angelo & Lowman, Policies, supra note 90, at 13.

100

Id. at 1.

101

Franken, Concepts, supra note 85, at 12-13.

102

Id.

103

Id.
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40 ILCS 5/3-125; 40 ILCS 5/4-118; Martin, Handbook, supra note 57, at 8. “90% funded” means that a fund’s accrued assets must be
at least 90% of its actuarial accrued liability.
106

It is unclear whether this requirement will be changed as 2040 approaches. If not, Article 3 and 4 pension funds could actually enter a
crisis imposed by the legislature. Hopefully, the public dialogue at that time will reflect the actual causes of the crisis: sponsor
underfunding, both overtly and covertly, as described in this article.
107

GRS, Assumptions, supra note 81, at I-4.

108

40 ILCS 5/3-125; 40 ILCS 5/4-118.

109

Franken, Concepts, supra note 85, at 18.

110

Id. at 16.

111

Id.

112

Id. at 18.

113

Id.

114

GRS, Assumptions, supra note 81, at I-4.

115

Public Act 101-0610 (Consolidation Law); Bruno, Mentality, supra note 24, at 3.

116

GRS, Assumptions, supra note 81, at I-5; Bruno, Mentality, supra note 24, at 17.

117

GRS, Assumptions, supra note 81, at I-5.

118

This is one of the many reasons why the fiscally responsible course of action is to contribute more money to pension funds in the present.

119

Grotto & Long, Digging, supra note 4, at 3. Mr. Atwood was recently named the interim executive director of the Illinois Firefighters'
Pension Investment Fund. Rob Kozlowski, New Illinois Firefighters Pension Fund Appoints Interim Executive Director, PENSIONS &
INVESTMENTS (Mar. 30, 2020), https://www.pionline.com/pension-funds/new-illinois-firefighters-pension-fund-appointsinterim-executive-director.
FOSTER & FOSTER, ACTUARIAL VALUATION REPORT – VILLAGE OF HOFFMAN ESTATES FIREFIGHTERS’ PENSION FUND, ACTUARIAL
VALUATION AS OF JANUARY 1, 2019, ,at 7-8 (Oct. 7, 2019), , https://www.hoffmanestates.org/home/showdocument?id=21790
[hereinafter Hoffman Estates Fire Report].
120

121

Id. at 8.

122

Again, the prospective benefit reductions the critics advocate would not decrease this $54.8 million pension debt by a single time.
Pension debt reflects benefits already accrued under existing law. See supra, note 16.
U.S. Census, Quick Facts, https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/fact/table/hoffmanestatesvillageillinois/POP010210.
Officially, the population estimate as of July 1, 2018 was 51,197. The “Persons in poverty,” no date given, is 4.5%.
123

124

Hoffman Estates Fire Report, supra, note 120, at 26 (revealing that benefit payments to members in 2018 amounted to $5,241,285).

125

This comparison is especially apt for pension funds, which cannot stop accruing new liabilities as long as new employees enter the
system.
126

See Aaron Wallace, Is the Sky Really Falling? 60 S. TEX. L. REV. 597, 603-05 (2019) (making similar point in criticizing relatively new
guidelines from the Governmental Accounting Standards Board).
127

Id. at 599-600.

Bruno, Mentality, supra note 24, at 5 (“While what level of unfunded liabilities is acceptable is debatable, focusing on just the funded
ratio target misdirects attention away from the larger issue of funding discipline.”); Wallace, Sky, supra note 126, at 601 & n. 20 (citing a
Haas I statute analyst that full funding of public pensions is a misguided goal and waste of taxpayer money).
128

129

See Wallace, Sky, supra note 126, at 598-99; see also TOM SGOUROS, , FUNDING PUBLIC PENSIONS: IS FULL PENSION FUNDING A
MISGUIDED GOAL? 6 (Hass Inst. For a Fair & Inclusive Soc’y Policy Brief. 2017), https://belonging.berkeley.edu/pensionaccounting
(click on “download the report here) (hereinafter Sgouros, Misguided). .
Jan Dennis, “Unfunded Liabilities” a Financial Myth, Expert Says, ILL. NEWS BUREAU (Apr.
https://news.illinois.edu/view/6367/205985 (challenging distinction between “funded” and “unfunded” liabilities).
130

131

Wallace, Sky, supra note 126, at 601-06; Sgouros, Misguided, supra note 129, at 4.

132

See supra, notes 92-125 and accompanying text.

1,

2009),
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Wallace, Sky, supra note 126, at 605.

134

Id.

135

Id.

136

Id. at 605-06.

137

Wallace, Sky, supra note 126, at 606; Sgouros, Misguided, supra note 129, at 28.

138

Wallace, Sky, supra note 126, at 606; Sgouros, Misguided, supra note 129, at 28.

139

Wallace, Sky, supra note 126, at 605-06.

140

Id. at 601, 603.

141

Bruno, Mentality, supra, note 24 at 4.

142

Id.

30

See generally National Conference on Public Employee Retirement Systems (NCPERS), Don’t Dismantle Public Pensions Because
They
Aren’t
100
Percent
Funded,
NCPERS
Research
Series
(Nov.
2017),
https://www.ncpers.org/files/
NCPERS%20Research%20Series_Dont%20Dismantle%20Public%20Pensions%20Because%20They%20Arent%20100%20Percent%20
Funded_Web.pdf (hereinafter NCPERS, Don’t).
143

144

Id. at 2.

145

Id. at 5, 8.

146

Id. at 7-8.

147

Id.

148

Id. at 8

149

Id.

150

Id.

151

Id. Wisconsin was 99% funded but had eight years of negative cash flow.

Id. at 1. The study further suggested that public pensions themselves “impose little or no burden on taxpayers” and are revenue-neutral
or revenue-positive. Id.
152

153

Id. at 11.

154

Id.

155

See supra, notes 49-73 and accompanying text.

156

40 ILCS 5/3-125(a); 40 ILCS 5/4-118(a). The financing provisions of Articles 3 and 4 are identical in all respects relevant to this article.

The Consolidation Law discussed in Part III of this article, infra, made changes to these provisions. For further discussion, see Part III.
157

Id.

158

Id. (emphasis added).

159

40 ILCS 5/3-125; 40 ILCS 5/4-118. Using these methods could, in fact, create an actual crisis similar to the ones the critics claim is
already happening. It is curious, then, that the critics do not seek to change the Pension Code to mandate the use of the Level Dollar and
EAN methods, which would be more likely to defuse a crisis. One suspects that lower taxes, not fiscal responsibility, are what the critics
seek.
160

40 ILCS 5/3-125(a); 40 ILCS 5/4-118(a). Sometimes, a pension fund itself retains an actuary known for artificially decreasing a
municipality’s minimum contribution. See infra, note 166 and accompanying text.
161

40 ILCS 5/3-125(a); 40 ILCS 5/4-118(b).

162

40 ILCS 5/3-125(c); 40 ILCS 5/4-118(b-5).

163

See infra, notes 251-265 and accompanying text.

164

See 40 ILCS 5/1-113.2 (governing funds with assets of up to $2,500,000); 40 ILCS 5/1-113.3 (governing funds with assets of up to
$5,000,000); 40 ILCS 5/1-113.4 (governing funds with assets of up to $10,000,000); 40 ILCS 5/1-113.4a (governing funds with assets of
$10,000,000 or more).
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165

Id. This was a significant consideration in the passage of Public Act 101-0610, which consolidated the investment assets of all the
individual police and fire pension funds. The investment parameters of the Consolidated Funds are less restrictive than those each individual
fund faced, which is expected to generate a greater return on investment. See infra, Section II.
Mark Glennon, Illinois Pension Actuary Defrocked. Finally. WIREPOINTS (Aug. 26, 2018), https://wirepoints.org/actuaryacademy-disciplines-timothy-sharpe-illinois-pension-actuary-finally/. The actuary’s license was suspended for two years.
166

Brown & Dye, Context, supra note 31, at Abstract. Data from fiscal year 2017 indicate that Illinois’ pensions are the third-worst-funded
in the country. Janelle Cammenga, How Well-Funded Are Pension Plans in Your State?, TAX FOUND. (Apr. 15, 2020)
https://taxfoundation.org/state-public-pension-plan-funding-coronavirus/.
167

168

Amanda Kass, Is Consolidating the Assets of Illinois Public Pension Funds a Good Idea? (Oct. 16, 2019),
https://amandakass.blog/2019/10/16/is-consolidating-the-assets-of-illinois-public-pension-funds-a-good-idea/)
(hereinafter
Kass,
Consolidation).
169

Id. As mentioned, in contrast to obtaining high returns, which all parties want, setting an expected rate of return is a matter of significant
controversy. A more optimistic projection of future returns leads to a lower municipal contribution.
170

Id.

171

Task Force Report, supra note 26.

172

Id. at 3; Kass, Consolidation, supra note 168.

173

Task Force Report, supra note 26, at 4.

174

Id.

175

Id.

Id. at 17. The Task Force Report acknowledged that “Tier 2 members receive a substantially smaller benefit relative to Tier 1 members
(those hired before 2011) and experience a pensionable salary cap that grows at a slower rate.” Id.
176

177

Id.

178

Id.

“A defined benefit retirement system maintained by a State, political subdivision or instrumentality thereof meets the requirements of
this paragraph (e)(2) with respect to an employee on a given day if and only if, on that day, the employee has an accrued benefit under the
system that entitles the employee to an annual benefit commencing on or before his or her Social Security retirement age that is at least
equal to the annual [retirement benefit] the employee would have under Social Security.” 26 C.F.R. § 31.3121(b)(7)-2.
179

180

Task Force Report, supra note 26, at 17.

181

Id.

182

Id.

183

Id. at 18.

184

Sam Dunklau Pritzker Signs First Responder Pension Consolidation Law, NPR ILLINOIS
https://www.nprillinois.org/post/pritzker-signs-first-responder-pension-consolidation-law#stream/0.
185

40 ILCS 5/22B-101; 40 ILCS 5/22C-101.

186

40 ILCS 5/22B-101; 40 ILCS 5/22C-101.

187

40 ILCS 5/22B-120; 40 ILCS 5/22C-120.

(Dec.

18,

2019),

40 ILCS 5/22B-122; 40 ILCS 5/22C-122. The specific restrictions on each Consolidated Funds’ investment authority are not clear. See
infra, notes 212-95
188

189

40 ILCS 5/22B-118(c); 40 ILCS 5/22C-118(c).

190

40 ILCS 5/22B-118; 40 ILCS 5/22C-118.

191

40 ILCS 5/22B-118(c); 40 ILCS 5/22C-118(c).

192

40 ILCS 5/22B-120(h); 40 ILCS 5/22C-120(h).

193

40 ILCS 5/22B-121(c); 40 ILCS 5/22C-121(c).

194

40 ILCS 5/3-132.1; 40 ILCS 5/4-123.2; 40 ILCS 5/22B-120(a).

195

40 ILCS 5/22B-120(c); 40 ILCS 5/22C-120(c).

196

Id.
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40 ILCS 5/22B-120(d); 40 ILCS 5/22C-120(d).

198

40 ILCS 5/22B-115; 40 ILCS 5/22C-115.

199

Id.

200

Id.

201

40 ILCS 5/22B-117(c); 40 ILCS 5/22C-117(c).

202

Id.

203

Id.

204

40 ILCS 5/22B-121(d); 40 ILCS 5/22C-121(d).

205

40 ILCS 5/22B-118(a); 40 ILCS 5/22C-118(a).

206

40 ILCS 5/22B-118(b); 40 ILCS 5/22C-118(b).

207

40 ILCS 5/22B-118(d); 40 ILCS 5/22C-118(d).

208

40 ILCS 5/22B-120(g); 40 ILCS 5/22C-120(g).

209

40 ILCS 5/22B-125(a); 40 ILCS 5/22C-125(a).

32

The Consolidation Law provides that each Board “shall from time to time transfer moneys and other assets to the participating
[downstate] pension funds as required”. 40 ILCS 5/22B-118(e); 40 ILCS 5/22C-118(e).
210

211

40 ILCS 5/22B-119; 40 ILCS 5/22C-119.

212

40 ILCS 5/22B-122; 40 ILCS 5/22C-122.

The Consolidation Law states, “The [Consolidated] Fund[s] shall not be subject to any of the limitations applicable to investments of
pension fund assets by the transferor pension funds under Sections 1-113.1 through 1-113.12 or Article [3 or 4] of this Code.” 40 ILCS
5/22B-122; 40 ILCS 5/C-122.
213

For example, Article 3 and 4 funds were exempt from the requirement of adopting a policy “that sets forth goals for utilization of
‘emerging investment managers,’” meaning firms that are minority-owned businesses, women-owned businesses, and businesses owned
by a person with a disability. 40 ILCS 5/1-109.1. The Consolidated Funds are subject to that requirement. 40 ILCS 5/22B-122; 40 ILCS
5/22C-122.
214

215

40 ILCS 5/1A-111; see also 40 ILCS 5/3-125; 40 ILCS 5/4-118 (provisions altered in part by Consolidation Law).

Id. 40 ILCS 5/1A-111(a)(2) provides, “[E]ach [annually-submitted] actuarial statement shall be prepared by or under the supervision of
a qualified actuary retained by the Consolidated Fund.” 40 ILCS 5/1A-111(a-5) provides, “[I]f a change occurs in an actuarial or investment
assumption that increases or decreases the actuarially required contribution for the pension fund, that change shall be implemented [over
three years].” 40 ILCS 5/1A-111(a-5) further provides, “The actuarially required contribution as described in this subsection shall
determine the annual required employer contribution.” Read together, these provisions indicate that the actuary retained by the
Consolidated Fund will make all the actuarial and investment assumptions necessary to calculate the employer minimum contribution, and
municipalities may not deviate from the actuary’s determination.
216

Some ambiguity appears to arise from the fact that the Consolidation Law does not change the financing provisions of Articles 3 and 4.
See 40 ILCS 5/3-125; 40 ILCS 5/4-118 (unaltered in relevant part by Consolidation Law). However, 40 ILCS 5/1A-111 clearly supplants
40 ILCS 5/3-125 and 40 ILCS 5/4-118 over time. 40 ILCS 5/1A-111 contemplates that the annual actuarial statement setting forth the
employer minimum contribution might be prepared by “a person other than the Department” during the transition period. 40 ILCS 5/1A111(a)(1). However, “[a]fter the conclusion of the transition period,” only the Consolidated Fund’s actuary may prepare this statement. 40
ILCS 5/1A-111(a)(2). Further, 40 ILCS 5/1A-111(a-5) states that before the transition period ends, the annual actuarial statements may be
prepared “utilizing the method for calculating the actuarially required contribution for the pension fund that was in effect prior to the
effective date of [the Consolidation Law].” 40 ILCS 5/1A-111(a-5). In other words, before the transition period ends, an actuary may still
use the PUC and Level Percentage of Payroll methods. Id. After the transition period ends, however, the Consolidated Fund’s actuary
prepares the statements. Id. Although the methods to be used are not specified, the Consolidation Law specifies that “the adoption of
actuarial assumptions” is a power reserved to the Boards of the Consolidated Funds. 40 ILCS 5/22B-117(c); 40 ILCS 5/22C-117(c). It
stands to reason that the actuarial assumptions adopted by each Board will be used by the actuary to prepare the annual actuarial reports.
Even though it does not amend 40 ILCS 5/3-125 or 40 ILCS 5/4-118 in a way relevant here, the Consolidation Law terminates municipal
input into the employer minimum contribution once the transition period ends. Only the Consolidated Fund’s Board, not any municipality,
will choose the assumptions underpinning the calculation of the annual contribution.
217

See 40 ILCS 5/3-125; 40 ILCS 5/4-118 (authorizing report by actuary retained by municipality).

218

This is the method employed by the IMRF.

219

40 ILCS 5/3-111; 40 ILCS 5/4-109 (eff. Jan. 1, 2011 to Dec. 31, 2019).
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40 ILCS 5/3-111; 40 ILCS 5/4-109 (eff. Jan. 1, 2020 as amended by Consolidation Law).

221

Instead of merely receiving 66 2/3% of the pension received by the employee, a surviving spouse will now receive the higher of that
amount or 54% of the monthly salary at the date of death. 40 ILCS 5/3-112; 40 ILCS 5/4-114.
40 ILCS 5/3-111; 40 ILCS 5/4-109. When created, Tier Two benefits based an employee’s final average salary on the “salary of the
[employee] during the 96 consecutive months of service within the last 120 months of service in which the total salary was highest” divided
by the total number of months, 96. The Consolidation Law provides that the final average salary will be the higher of this number, or the
salary of the employee during the 48 consecutive months of service in the last 60 months during which total salary is highest, divided by
48. Since most employees receive annual wage increases through the collective bargaining agreement or promotions, the new calculation
method will provide an increase in final average salary, and therefore an increase in pension, in most cases.
222

223

Task Force Report, supra note 26, at 18.

224

Email conversation with Jason Franken, Nov. 13, 2019. Franken is an accountant licensed in the State of Illinois. He is a member of
the Conference of Consulting Actuaries (“CCA”) and a featured speaker at CCA meetings on the subject of employee benefits.
https://profile.actuarialdirectory.org/SearchDirectory/MemberDetail.aspx?CustomerRecord=dVlNEsnEBjmjjYQ0GZ9Hqj6swn6A18E1
Vujhimo75jucf2mF7sKplw==Franken is employed by the actuarial and consulting firm Foster & Foster. https://foster-foster.com/. .
225

Jerry Nowicki, From 649 Funds to 2: Pritzker Signs Pension Consolidation Bill, DAILY HERALD (Dec. 18, 2019),
https://www.dailyherald.com/news/20191218/from-649-funds-to-2-pritzker-signs-pension-consolidation-bill.
226

Id.

227

See supra, note 216 and accompanying text.

228

Fred Imbert, Dow Jumps 170 Points, Amazon Leads S&P 500 and Nasdaq to Record Highs, CNBC (Feb. 10, 2020)
https://www.cnbc.com/2020/02/10/us-futures-point-to-cautious-open-as-investors-monitor-coronavirus.html.
229

Yahoo! Finance Dow Jones Industrial Average, day-by-day, https://finance.yahoo.com/quote/%5EDJI/history/.

230

Id.

231

40 ILCS 5/1-113.4a.

232

See supra, note 212 and accompanying text.

233Pub.

L. 116-136, 134 Stat. 281 (Mar. 27, 2020); see also U.S. Dept. of the Treasury, The CARES Act Works for All Americans,
https://home.treasury.gov/policy-issues/cares (hereinafter Treasury, CARES).
The Institute for Illinois’ Fiscal Sustainability, How Will CARES Act Funding Be Divided Among Illinois and its Local Governments,
(Apr. 15, 2020), https://www.civicfed.org/iifs/blog/how-will-cares-act-funding-be-divided-among-illinois-and-its-localgovernments (hereinafter Institute, CARES).
234

235

Treasury, CARES, supra note 233.

236

U.S. Dept. of the Treasury, Payments to State and Eligible Units of Local
https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/136/Payments-to-States-and-Units-of-Local-Government.pdf.
237

Government

3,

CARES Act, supra note 233.

Id. The Treasury Department’s guidance appears to permit use of this money to support public employee pension funds. See U.S. Dept.
of the Treasury, Coronavirus Relief Fund Guidance for State, Territorial, Local, and Tribal Governments (Apr. 22, 2020),
https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/136/Coronavirus-Relief-Fund-Guidance-for-State-Territorial-Local-and-TribalGovernments.pdf. The guidance permits using the aid to offset “expenditures incurred to respond to second-order effects of the
emergency.” The guidance also gives examples of eligible expenditures of funds, which include “Payroll expenses for public safety, public
health … and similar employees whose services are substantially dedicated to mitigating or responding to the COVID-19 public health
emergency,” which may include firefighters and possibly police officers. Elsewhere, the guidance permits expenditures of funds “related
to a State, territorial, local, or Tribal government payroll support program.” However, the guidance lists ineligible expenditures to include
payroll or benefits expenses for employees not substantially dedicated to mitigating or responding to COVID-19.
238

239

U.S. Dept. of the Treasury, Coronavirus Relief Fund Frequently Asked Questions (updated as of May 4, 2020),
https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/136/Coronavirus-Relief-Fund-Frequently-Asked-Questions.pdf.
240

Id. The Frequently Asked Questions also allow the transfer of funds from one unit of local government to another, including a school
district. A pension fund would therefore fall within the definition of a “unit of local government.”
241

Doug Sword, Unions, Employers Want Pension Relief Included in Coronavirus Aid Talks, ROLL CALL (Apr. 17, 2020),
https://www.rollcall.com/2020/04/17/unions-employers-pitch-pension-relief-in-coronavirus-aid-talks/.
Heroes Act, H..R..6800 (2020), https://www.congress.gov/bill/116th-congress/house-bill/6800/text?r=48&s=1#tocH8288223BC68D4195AD7ECE5395AC97E3; Hazel Bradford, House Relief Act Comes with Multiemployer Changes – and
242
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Controversy, PENSIONS & INVESTMENTS (May 15, 2020), https://www.pionline.com/legislation/house-relief-act-comesmultiemployer-changes-and-controversy (hereinafter Bradford, Changes).
243

Bradford, Changes, supra note 242.

244

Illinois Democrats Seek $41B in Federal Coronavirus Relief, Including $10B Pension Bailout, NORTHWEST HERALD (Apr. 19, 2020),
https://www.nwherald.com/2020/04/19/illinois-democrats-seek-41b-in-federal-coronavirus-relief-including-10b-pensionbailout/addwl95/ (referring to relief for pension funds as a “bailout”).
$10 Billion Illinois Pension Bailout Request Ignites Controversy, CHIEF INVESTMENT OFFICER (Apr. 21, 2020), https://www.aicio.com/news/10-billion-illinois-pension-bailout-request-ignites-controversy/ (hereinafter Chief, $10 Billion).
245

Jeremy Scott, LaHood: To Receive More Aid, Illinois Must Make Changes (Apr. 20, 2020), https://
www.933thedrive.com/2020/04/21/lahood-to-receive-more-aid-illinois-must-make-changes/ (hereinafter Scott, Changes).
LaHood did not elaborate as to how or why he considered Illinois’ pension system inequitable.
246

LaHood has voted to expend federal money on a border wall. See http://clerk.house.gov/evs/2018/roll282.xml (voting results on
House Resolution 4760, June 21, 2018). That bill—the Securing America’s Future Act—would have elevated being in the country without
status from a civil offense to a criminal one. See Tom Jawetz & Philip E. Wolgin, The Four Worst Parts of the Securing America’s Future
Act (June 7, 2018) https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/immigration/news/2018/06/07/451726/4-worst-partssecuring-americas-future-act/. It is unclear whether LaHood considered “mak[ing] the system more equitable” before voting to use
federal money to build the border wall.
Scott, Changes, supra note 246. LaHood said, “Let’s give money directly to the City of Peoria. Let them decide how to spend the money
the best way that they can, so we don’t have to lay off 50 police and firemen in Peoria.” Instead of repairing the pension system from the
damage that non-funding has caused, LaHood would give the money to a municipality, with no oversight, with the threat that Article 3 and
4 pension fund members would lose their jobs if his plan was not followed.
247

LaHood also stated that the state must withdraw the proposed Graduated Income Tax increase plan that is set to go to the voters in
November. Scott, Changes, supra note 246. That plan would finally permit Illinois to tax high-earners at a higher marginal rate than lowearners. It is not clear whether LaHood stated why he was making this demand, but it is consistent with a desire to steer money away from
people who need it and to avoid placing the tax burden on those who can afford it.
248

See Chief, $10 Billion, supra note 245.

Editorial: Illinois’ Shameless, Dishonest Ask for a Federal Bailout, CHI. TRIB. (Apr. 19, 2020), https://www.chicagotribune.com/
opinion/editorials/ct-edit-illinois-seeks-federal-bailout-pensions-coronavirus-20200419-ymvxr3m2lzd3zcoyytbahkyqkistory.html.
249

This appears to be the second Chicago Tribune editorial about a potential “bailout” for the state’s pension systems in light of COVID-19.
See Commentary: Pension Bailouts Are Not the Answer for Chicago and Illinois—Even During a Pandemic CHI. TRIB. (Mar. 30, 2020),
https://www.chicagotribune.com/opinion/editorials/ct-edit-illinois-seeks-federal-bailout-pensions-coronavirus-20200419ymvxr3m2lzd3zcoyytbahkyqki-story.html.
States Like Illinois Need Coronavirus Relief for Pensions and Healthcare, CRAIN’S CHI. BUS. (Mar. 26, 2020),
https://www.chicagobusiness.com/opinion/states-illinois-need-coronavirus-relief-pensions-and-health-care.
250

251

40 ILCS 5/3-125(c); 40 ILCS 5/4-118(b-5).

252

People ex rel. Sklodowski v. State, 182 Ill.2d 220, 227-33, 695 N.E.2d 374, 377-79 (1998); McNamee v. State, 173 Ill.2d 433, 439-46 ,
672 N.E.2d 1159, 1162-66(1996)
A representative case is Bd. of Trustees of City of Harvey Firefighters’ Pension Fund v. City of Harvey, 2017 IL App (1st) 153074, 96
N.E.3d 1. In Harvey, the pension board filed a complaint in 2010 seeking to enforce a settlement agreement from 1996 that the city violated
from 2005-2010. Harvey is rare in that the Harvey court found that the pension fund was on the verge of default, which triggered the
Pension Protection Clause. Despite finding for the pension board on most issues, and affirming a $15 million judgment, the appellate court
denied the pension board a writ of mandamus, allowing the city—which violated statutory and settlement requirements—to continue to
calculate its tax levy going forward. Further, despite prevailing in large part, the pension board was injured by the fact that city violations
that occurred in 2005 were not finally adjudicated until 2017, denying the pension board of money it was entitled to for twelve years.
253

254

40 ILCS 5/3-125(c); 40 ILCS 5/4-118(b-5).

255

74 Ill. Admin. Code § 295.300.

256

74 Ill. Admin. Code § 295.600(a).

257

74 Ill. Admin. Code § 295.600(a)(3); 74 Ill. Admin. Code § 295.600(b).

258

74 Ill. Admin. Code § 295.600(d).

259

74 Ill. Admin. Code § 295.600.
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735 ILCS 5/3-101 et seq.

261

Accord Comments of LaHood, supra note 247 (asserting that giving federal aid to pension funds might cause municipalities to lay off
the participants in those funds).
262

See, e.g., Harvey, 2017 IL App (1st) 153074 96 N.E.3d 1.

263

40 ILCS 5/7-172.1.

40 ILCS 5/22B-118(c); 40 ILCS 5/22C-118(c) (“The board [of each Consolidated Fund] shall separately calculate account balances for
each participating pension fund. The operations and financial condition of each participating pension fund account shall not affect the
account balance of any other participating pension fund.”).
264

265

See Bob Lawless, Can a State File Bankruptcy? (ReBroadcast), ILL. PUB. MEDIA, WILL AM 580( Nov. 21, 2016),
https://will.illinois.edu/legalissuesinthenews/program/can-a-state-file-bankruptcy.
266

Bruno & Manzo, Working, supra note 26, at 22. Strangely, the failure to tax higher incomes at a higher rate is generally absent from
critics’ discussions about Illinois’ budget and is not a proposal that pension critics advance.
267

“A tax on or measured by income shall be at a non-graduated rate.” ILL. CONST. 1970, article IX, section 3(a).

268

Governor Pritzker signed legislation to place this issue on the November 2020 ballot. Tina Sfondeles, Graduated Income Tax Question
Heads to Ballot as House Oks Constitutional Amendment, CHI. SUN TIMES (May 27, 2019), https://chicago.suntimes.com/
2019/5/27/18641670/graduated-income-tax-illinois-house-constitutional-amendment-2020-ballot. For its part, the IPI
opposes a graduated income tax, despite the fact that it would likely raise revenue and alleviate the fiscal concerns the IPI itself often raises.
See Austin Berg, Why Illinoisans Can’t Trust Pritzker’s Tax Promises, ILL. POL’Y INST. (Mar. 14, 2019),
https://www.illinoispolicy.org/why-illinoisans-cant-trust-pritzkers-tax-promises/. And as mentioned, LaHood opposes the
graduated income tax. See supra, note 247.
269

40 ILCS 5/3-125; 40 ILCS 5/4-118. Some municipalities deviate from this funding scheme; those deviations are not challenged in court.
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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
By Student Editorial Board:
Enrique Espinoza, MaryKate Hresil, Nicholas Lisle, Erin Monforti
Recent Developments is a regular feature of the Illinois Public Employee Relations
Report. It highlights recent legal developments of interest to the public employee
relations community.

I.

IPLRA DEVELOPMENTS

A. Arbitration
In City of Chicago v. Fraternal Order of Police, 2020 IL 124831 (Ill. June 18, 2020), the
Illinois Supreme Court held that an arbitration award that directed the City of Chicago
and the Fraternal Order of Police (FOP) to establish a procedure for the City to comply
with Section 8.4 of their collective bargaining agreement (CBA) was contrary to public
policy and, therefore, unenforceable. Section 8.4, provided for the destruction of
Chicago police disciplinary records and related documents five years following the
incident or the discovery of the violation. Section 8.4 has been the subject of
controversy since 1991, when a federal district judge ordered the City to cease destroying
complaint register files; other judges hearing civil rights cases involving Chicago police
followed suit. The City was unsuccessful in its subsequent attempts to eliminate Section
8.4 from the CBA.
In response to several requests for policy misconduct records under the Freedom of
Information Act (FOIA), the City in 2014 informed the FOP of its intention to release
records that, under the CBA, should have been destroyed. The FOP sought a preliminary
injunction, which was granted by the circuit court, disallowing the release of any records
more than four years old as of the date of the FOIA request. The City thereafter filed an
interlocutory appeal. When the United States Department of Justice (DOJ) began
investigating patterns of excessive force and discriminatory police practices in Chicago
in December 2015, it requested that the City preserve all misconduct-related documents,
including those that were the subject of the ongoing arbitration cases. The arbitrator
shortly thereafter issued his original opinion calling for compliance with the CBA.
In July 2016, the City filed a petition in the circuit court to vacate the arbitration award
because it violated Illinois public policy pursuant to the Local Records Act, 50 ILCS 205,
et seq. The FOP filed a counter-petition, but in October 2017 the circuit court granted
the City’s petition to vacate on the ground that enforcing the award violated the public
policy to maintain public records. The appellate court affirmed, holding that the
destruction of records was based not on the requisite consideration of whether the
records have “ . . . administrative, legal, research or historical value . . . ”, 50 ILCS
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205/10, but rather on an arbitrary fixed period of time. The FOP appealed, and the
Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court’s decision.
The Illinois Supreme Court employed a two-step analysis developed in AFSCME v.
Department of Central Management Services, 173 Ill. 2d 229, 671 N.E.2d 668 (1996),
which asks whether a clearly defined and strong public policy can be identified in
constitutional, statutory, or judicial authority and then determines whether the award in
question violates the public policy. Looking to the plain language of the Local Records
Act, the court found a clear public policy to preserve public records, with destruction
becoming appropriate only after review by the Local Records Commission. The court
found that the arbitration award violated the policy of the Local Records Act. The court
rejected the FOP’s efforts to reconcile the contractual clause with the Local Records Act
because, although the City could begin to comply with the award by submitting the
records to the Records Commission, it could not comply with the award and the law if
the Commission refused to allow the records’ destruction. The court held that the Local
Records Act and the contract were irreconcilable, as any denial of destruction by the
Commission would run counter to the contract—and any attempt by the City to comply
with the contract’s terms outside the Commission’s purview would be contrary to public
policy.
The court concluded that state law must prevail over contracts, as “[a] contract expressly
prohibited by law is void, and there is no exception to this rule for the reason that a law
cannot at the same time prohibit a contract and enforce it.” The court rejected the FOP’s
argument that section 15 of the IPLRA requires giving effect to CBA provisions that
conflict with state statutes. The court reasoned that such a holding would eliminate the
public policy exception in all cases involving collective bargaining and resulting
contractual terms.
B. Discrimination
In Carmen Rentas and County of Cook, Health and Hospital System, Case No. L-CA19-078 (ILRB Local Panel June 19, 2020), the Local Panel affirmed the Executive
Director’s dismissal of an unfair labor practice that alleged that Cook County Health
retaliated against Rentas on the basis of “her race and/or national origin.”
The Local Panel affirmed the Executive Director’s dismissal of the charge on the ground
that the charging party failed to allege the Respondent took adverse action against her
because she engaged in activities protected under the Act. The Executive Director noted
that Charging Party alleged that the Respondent retaliated against her because “she
made claims of gender, national origin, and age discrimination.”
Finding the appeal without merit, the Local Panel noted that “[t]he Executive Director
correctly determined that the Charging Party did not raise issues for hearing on the
allegation that the Respondent retaliated against her for engaging in protected,
concerted activity.” The Local Panel noted, “Even on appeal, the Charging Party
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describes her protected conduct as a complaint to ‘EEO Nick in HR’ and ‘complaint[s] to
EEOC/IL[D]HR.’” (Alterations in original.)
The Local Panel held:
To raise issues for hearing on a retaliation claim arising under Section 10(a)(1) of
the Act, the charging party must present some evidence on each element of her
prima facie case, namely, that[:] (1) she engaged in union and/or protected,
concerted activity, (2) the Respondent knew of that activity[;] (3) the Respondent
took adverse action against her; and (4) her protected, concerted activity and/or
union activity was a substantial or motivating factor in the adverse employment
action.
Here, the Charging Party alleged she was engaged in protected activity, suggested that
the Operating Room Flow Coordinator, Cean Magosky, disciplined her with a one-day
suspension, and proffered suspicious timing as evidence of a causal connection between
her grievance and the adverse action. Regardless, the Local Panel held suspicious timing
alone was not enough to “raise issues for hearing [under the Act].” Turning to the
Charging Party’s remaining arguments for suspicious timing, the Local Panel further
determined there was insufficient evidence, particularly here the Charging Party made a
blanket assertion that the Respondent “knew of her protected activity,” and where the
Charging Party alleged she received two suspensions in retaliation but it was unclear
whether those resulted from the grievances filed.
For the forgoing reasons, the Local Panel affirmed the Executive Director’s dismissal.

II.

ILLINOIS SCHOOL CODE DEVELOPMENTS

In Dynak v. Board of Education of Wood Dale School District 7, 2020 IL 125062 (Ill.
Apr. 16, 2020), the Illinois Supreme Court ruled that a teacher who gives birth at the
end of one school year is not entitled under Illinois School Code to use her accrued paid
sick leave at the start of a new school year.
On March 15, 2016, Margaret Dynak, a full-time teacher employed by Wood Dale School
District 7 (District), notified the District she was due to give birth on June 6, 2016. She
requested to use 1.5 days of her accumulated paid sick leave on the last 1.5 days of the
school year in June. She also requested to use 12 weeks of leave pursuant to the Family
and Medical Leave Act, beginning the first day of the 2016-17 school year. Additionally,
she requested to use paid sick leave for the first 28.5 days of her FMLA leave, allegedly
pursuant to section 24-6 of the School Code.
In Dynak, the court had to determine whether section 24-6 of the Illinois School Code,
105 ILCS 5/24-6, allowed a teacher who gives birth at the end of the school year to use
her accumulated paid sick leave at the start of the next school year. The school district
denied Dynak’s request to use paid sick leave at the beginning of the new school year
following, approximately two months after the birth, giving rise to the issue. Plaintiff
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filed a complaint for declaratory judgment in the Circuit Court of DuPage County, where
the court held in favor of the school district; the Appellate Court affirmed.
Section 24-6 defines sick leave for full-time teachers and certain school district
employees in municipalities with populations of less than 500,000 people. 105 ILCS
5/24-6. The statute provides that eligible employees shall be granted at least 10 paid sick
days per school year, with the unused amount allowed to accumulate. Through a
legislative amendment in 2007, “birth, adoption, or placement for adoption,” was added
to the definition of sick leave. Plaintiff interpreted the statute as allowing sick leave for
birth to be open-ended and noncontinuous. The Illinois Supreme Court disagreed.
The court determined the statute expressly limits a teacher's right to use paid sick leave
for birth. Reading its plain terms, it provides “sick leave” to certain teachers and school
employees for various events requiring employees to be absent from work. The court
reasoned the statute includes “birth” in its list of events triggering a teacher's right to
use her accumulated paid sick leave. Moreover, the court noted the statute even states
that a medical certificate is required “as a basis for pay during leave after an absence of
30 days for birth.” Ultimately, the court reasoned the language of the School Code
strongly suggests that the legislature intended that “sick leave for birth must have a
temporal connection to the birth.” Theretofore, the court deduced the 30-day
requirement could only make sense if its intent was for paid sick leave to follow
immediately after the birth.
The court reinforced its understanding by considering that “birth” is contained within a
group of other qualifying events, which also have a temporal connection. Finding “the
most reasonable and consistent reading of the statute is [one] that it allows an employee
who experiences a qualifying event to use accumulated paid sick leave at the time of that
event, not later at the employee's discretion,” the court held for the District.
Ultimately, the court held that under section 24-6, “[T]eachers may use up to 30 days of
accumulated paid sick leave during the six-week period immediately following the
birth.” (Emphasis in original.)

III. WORKERS COMPENSATION DEVELOPMENTS
On June 5, 2020, by Illinois Gov. J.B. Pritzker signed HB 2455 into law. The
amendment to the workers compensation law creates a rebuttable presumption that an
essential employee's contraction of Covid-19 occurred in the course of employment and
therefore is eligible for workers' compensation benefits.
The amendment applies to any first responder or front-line worker diagnosed with
Covid-19 on or after March 9, 2020, and on or before December 31, 2020. The
amendment specifies that the “presumption shall apply to any fireman [or policeman]
who was exposed to and contracted COVID-19 on or after March 9, 2020, and on or
before December 31, 2020; except that the presumption shall not apply if the fireman
[or policeman] was on a leave of absence from his or her employment or otherwise not
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required to report for duty for a period of 14 or more consecutive days immediately prior
to the date of contraction of COVID-19.”
The presumption only applies to workers who: required to interact with the public, or
work with fifteen or more employees at their place of business. Except for home care
workers, an employee's residence is not considered their place of business.
Claimants must establish they contracted COVID-19 through a confirmed diagnosis
from a licensed medical practitioner or a positive laboratory test for COVID-1 or COVID19 antibodies. The amendment extends the rebuttable presumption for ordinary death
benefits related to death in the line of duty because of COVID-19.
The employer may rebut the presumption by evidence, including but not limited to, the
following:
1. Compliance with the fullest extent practicable with applicable health and
safety practices and guidance in the fourteenth days prior to the diagnosis
2. Establishing the claimant contracted the virus somewhere else.
3. Showing the claimant worked from home or was off work in the fourteen
days prior to the diagnosis.
Finally, an employer is entitled to a credit against any liability for temporary total
disability due to an employee as a result of the employee contracting COVID-19 for (A)
any sick leave benefits or extended salary benefits paid to the employee by the employer
under Emergency Family Medical Leave Expansion Act, Emergency Paid Sick Leave Act
of the Families First Coronavirus Response Act, or any other federal law, or (B) any
other credit to which an employer is entitled under the Workers' Compensation Act.

